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Introduction
This thesis consists of three papers, analysing the effects o f government spending on 
foreign trade, the role of financial frictions in the transmission of monetary policy 
and changes over time in the effects o f fiscal policy, respectively. To address these 
issues I combine Vector Alltoregrossions (VAU) and Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) models of the New Keynesian type.
In each chapter the focus is on policy innovations or shocks, i.e. exogenous differ­
ences between private sector expectations and realizations of policy variables. The 
transmission o f these shocks, i.e. the induced adjustment process of the economy, is 
investigated, because it is informative about the channels through which monetary 
and fiscal policies affect the economy. It is neatly summarized by impulse response 
functions both in the DSGE and the VAU model and therefore it seems natural to 
consider this statistic as the critical nexus between theory and data.
The first chapter is entitled "Understanding the Dynamic Effects of Government 
Spending on Foreign Trade." It is motivated by a recent VAU analysis of Kim and 
Iloubini (2003) whereby an exogenous increase in the budget deficit is found to 
reduce the current account deficit. Since this is in stark contrast witli the popular 
twin deficit hypothesis, it is worthwhile to explore the ability of a New Keynesian 
DSGE model to account for this finding.
To do so, I focus on only government spending shocks both in a VAU on U.S. 
time series and the DSGE model. This allows a clear mapping of the model im­
pulse response functions into those o f the VAU. The latter show a depreciation of 
the nominal exchange rate, an appreciation of the terms of trade and an increase 
in net exports in response to an exogenous increase in government spending. If the 
moded is exposed to the same shock, it is shown to match qualitatively the res]>ouse 
of relative prices. The response o f net exports, in contrast, depends on the intra- 
and intertemporal elasticities of substitution and the degree of home bias in private 
consumption. Since the empirical findings are new and not yet well established in 
the literature1 it seems important to establish that, in principle, the New Keynesian 
DSGE model is able to account for the sign of the impulse response functions. How­
ever, the impulse response functions are matched only qualitatively, as the DSGE 
model is not rich enough to capture fully the dynamics observed in the data.
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The second chapter, co-authored with André Meier, is entitled "Fleshing out the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Output Composition and the Hole o f Financial 
Frictions," Given that financial frictions affect the way in which different components 
of GDP respond to a monetary policy shock, we aim to establish whether such 
frictions can play a quantitatively important role in accounting for monetary policy 
transmission. In the words o f Woodford (2003) one needs to "flesh out the details 
of a quantitatively realistic account of the monetary transmission mechanism."
We therefore embed the financial accelerator of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1999) into a medium scale New Keynesian DSGE model and evaluate the relative 
importance of financial frictions in accounting for the transmission of monetary 
policy. Specifically, we match the impulse responses generated by the model with 
empirical impulse response functions obtained from a VAR on US time series data, 
This allows us to provide estimates for the structural parameters o f our model anti 
to judge the relevance of different model features. In addition, we propose a set of 
simple and instinctive specification tests that can be used to assess the relative fit 
o f various restricted models. Although we find mild evidence for financial frictions, 
they are of minor importance for the descriptive quality o f the model.
The third chapter, co-authored with Florin Bilbiie and André Meier, is entitled 
"Asset Market Participation, Monetary Policy and the Effects o f US Government 
Spending: What Accounts for the Declining Fiscal Multiplier?" This research starts 
from the observation of Perotti (2005) that the effects of fiscal policy are considerably 
weaker in the post-1980s if compared with earlier periods.
Using a VAR on U.S. time series and comparing the periods 1957-1979 and 
1983-200-1, we provide further evidence, that the responses of output, wages and 
consumption to a government spending shock are typically weaker in the second 
sample. In a second step, this observation is rationalized within a New Keynesian 
DSGE model featuring non-asset holding agents. Specifically, the structural para­
meters o f the model are estimated for both samples by matching impulse response 
functions. We find that asset market participation increased from about fifty to 
about seventy percent. In order to assess whether this increase accounts for the 
declining fiscal multiplier we run counterfactual model-based experiments. These 
experiments point to an important role of asset market participation in fiscal trans­
mission, but also show that changes in the conduct of monetary policy may he key 
in accounting for the declining fiscal multiplier.
Finally. I am very much indebted to Giancarlo Corsetti and Roberto Perotti for 
their advice and guidance while writing this thesis.
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Chapter 1
Understanding the Dynamic 
Effects of Government Spending 
on Foreign Trade
1.1 Introduction
The present paper studies the dynamic effects of a temporary increase in government 
spending on foreign trade. Its aim is twofold, h irst, it seeks to establish empiriea lb- 
how the exchange rate, the terms o f trade and the trade balance (net exports) 
respond to an exogenous increase in government spending. Second, it rationalizes 
those responses within a stochastic general equilibrium model which features price 
rigidit ies and thus gives an important role to monetary policy.
Empirical investigations, based on Vector Autoregressions (VAR), of the dynamic 
effects of fiscal policy within a closed economy context have become more numerous 
recent ly. Attempts have also been made to account for this evidence using different 
versions of stochastic general equilibrium models, e.g. Fatiis and Mihov (2001), 
Burnside, Eichonbaum anti Fisher (2001) and Gali, Ldpez-Salido and Valles (2001). 
Little evidence, however, has been put forward regarding the dynamic effects of 
government spending on foreign trade. Exceptions «re Kim anti Ronbini (2003) 
and Giuliotlori and Bectsma (2001), who do not, however, explore their empirical 
findings within a formal theoretical framework. Canzoneri, Cumby anti Diha (2003) 
also provide a VAR analysis of the effects of fiscal policy on foreign trade anti, 
although they analyze their findings within a general equilibrium model, they make 
the restricitive assumption that trade is always balanct'd.
From a policy perspective, the recent U.S. macroeconomic stance provides a par­
ticular motivation to investigate the dynamic effect of fiscal policy on foreign trade 
in a loose monetary environment. It is often assumed that the current fiscal stance 
is contributing to the ongoing deterioration of the U.S. trade balance, tints stimu­
lating the global economy at the expense of increased global imbalances, see, e.g. 
International Monetary Fund (2001). At the same time the current accommodating
1
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monetary policy stance is generally thought to have an opposite efieet on net ex­
ports.1 Hence, the overall effect of the expansionary l T.S. fiscal-monetary stance on 
the U.S. trade balance appears to be unclear.
Against this background, this paper takes up these issues both at an empirical 
and a theoretical level. The main results o f the empirical analysis can be summarized 
as follows. It finds that following a temporary increase in government spending the 
nominal exchange rate depreciates, the terms of trade appreciate and net exports 
increase. These results are obtained from a VAR on U.S. time series data for the 
post-Bretton-Woods period. While somewhat surprising, the result, regarding the 
trade balance is consistent with previous findings o f Kim and Roubini regarding the 
current account.
The theoretical analysis is based on a model that belongs to a recent class of 
stochastic general equilibrium models for open economies which also feature sticky 
prices, see, for example, Benigno and Benigno (2003), Chari, Kehoe and McGrat­
tan (2002) and Cl all and Monacelli (2001). The model is formulated in discrete 
time and linearized around a non-stochastic steady state. In such a framework an 
exogenous increase in government spending generates dynamic effects comparable 
to those identified in the data by means of a VAR. Price stickiness, in turn, gives 
a non-trivial role to monetary policy in determining the equilibrium response to a 
temporary increase in government spending. This is investigated by assuming that 
monetary policy is endogenously characterized by an interest rate feedback rule.
The main results of the theoretical analysis are as follows. First, because of 
home bias in government spending, the terms of trade appreciate after an exogenous 
increase in government spending. Next, under the assumption that international 
financial markets are complete, the relative size o f the elasticities of intertemporal 
and intratemporal substitution, together with the degree of home bias in private 
consumption, are key for the sign of the response of the trade balance. If the elasticity 
o f intertemporal substitution exceeds the elasticity o f intratemporal substitution, net 
exports will increase after an increase in government spending if private consumption 
is substantially home biased.* "
Second, regarding the role o f monetary policy, the sign of the response of the
Hn tho standard one-good intertemporal model of the current account, a temporary increase 
in government spending lowers net exports, see Ahmed (1986) for a seminal study and Kollmann 
(1998) for an exploration within a two-country RBC model. Also, in the Munde]]-Fleming model 
with flexible exchange rates and perfect capital mobility a fiscal expansion in the home country 
increases domestic demand for both home and foreign goods thereby reducing net exports, see 
the discussion in Svensson (1987). In contrast, an expansionary monetary policy is thought to 
depreciate the exchange rate and to switch expenditure towards home goods.
*The role o f these elasticities for the international transmission of policy shocks has also been 
highlighted by Svensson (1987), Van der Ploeg (1993). Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Tille (2001). 
However, for different reasons these models are less suitable for a comparison with the VAR evidence 
obtained in the first part of the present paper. One common feature in Svensson, Corset ti and 
Pesenti and Tille is that prices or wages are assumed to be set one period in advance. This implies 
that these models distinguish between the short run ami long run effects of a policy shock. Van 
der Ploeg introduces nominal rigidities by means o f an augmented Phillips Curve, but sets up his 
model in continuous time.
M* * mmèuttk
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terms of trade and the trade balance is shown to be independent of the monetary 
regime. However, an accommodating monetary policy in the home country dampens 
the effect o f the fiscal shock both on the terms of trade and the trade balance. Finally, 
it is also shown that assuming incomplete international financial markets does not 
affect the results qualitatively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, evidence 
on the dynamic effects o f government spending is obtained by means of a VAR on 
U.S. time series data. Section 3 describes the theoretical model, while Section I 
provides some analytical insights into the transmission of fiscal shocks as well as a 
numerical solution of the model. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 The Evidence
So far, only a few empirical studies have investigated the dynamic effects of fiscal 
policies on foreign trade. There is some VAR-based evidence, however, that fiscal 
expansions afTeot exchange rates and foreign trade, Clarida and Prendergast (1999) 
consider an increase in the structural deficit in Germany, .Japan and the U.S. and 
find that the real exchange rate appreciates on impact, while this effect is reversal 
later. Cmizoneri, Cumby and Diba (2003) also find a real appreciation of the dollar 
after an increase in U.S. government spending. In addition, they observe a positive 
effect on foreign GDP (France, Italy and the U.K.). Similar in spirit, Giuliodori and 
Iloetsma (2001), using European data find an increase in imports after an increase in 
government spending, while they do not observe a major effect on the real exchange 
rate. In contrast to these studies, Kim and Roubini (2003), using U.S. data, find 
the real exchange rate to depreciate after a fiscal expansion and the current account 
to increase.
1.2.1 Baseline specification
These studies provide the starting point for the following analysis and motivate :
the choice o f variables included in the VAR. Instead of the real exchange rate, I ;
include both the nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade. The terms of trade j:
are more likely to capture the cross-border substitution process induced by fiscal ;;
expansions as they provide a measure for the relative price of tradoables only. The J
nominal exchange rate is included to account for monetary phenomena during the f
transmission o f  fiscal shocks. Finally, I include the trade balance (net exports) as a j;
summary statistic for the efTects o f fiscal policy on foreign trade. J;
Specifically, I include six variables in the baseline VAR: the log of real government j;
spending per capita, the log of real GDP per capita, the log of the GDP deflator. \
the log of the nominal exchange rate, the log of the terms of trade and the trade if
balance.'1 The baseline specification includes four lags of each endogenous variable. j: 3
3Net taxes, the real exchange rate and interest rates are also considered below. Most o f the data |
are from the N1PA available online at the Bureau o f Economic Analysis. Real government spending j;
4'-*
mm mm
1 Chapter 1 - Government Spending and Foreign 'Trade
a constant and a linear time trend. For the estimation U.S. quarterly data from the 
post-Bretton-Woods period (1973:1 - 2003:1) are used.
In order to identify an exogenous shock to government spending, it is assumed 
that government spending floes not respond contemporaneously to changes in the 
other variables included in the VAR. This assumption goes hack to Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) and Fat<h> and Mihov (2001) and is now widely used in the VAR 
literature on fiscal policy. It appears justified, because government spending is 
defined as government consumption and investment and does not include transfer 
payments.* 4
Figure 1 displays the responses to a fiscal shock, i.e. a one percent increase in 
government spending. While the solid line gives the point estimates, the shaded area 
gives the 95 percent confidence interval, computed by the Ilall bootstrap procedure 
based on 1000 replications. Government spending rises significantly and persistently, 
with a half-life of about six quarters. GDP rises significantly on impact and remains 
above trend for almost two years. Given an average share of government spending in 
GDP of twenty percent. I find a government spending multiplier on output of about 
one. i.e. a value similar to the one reported by Blanchard and Perot ti (2002). Prices 
fall after an increase in government spending (though not significantly), a finding 
also reported in other studies, e.g. Mount ford and Ulilig (2001) and Perot ti (2005).r'
Now consider the dynamic, effects of a temporary increase in government spending 
on variables which charac terize external trade. The nominal exchange rate depre­
ciates on impact and this effect becomes stronger and significant after six quarters. 
The terms of trade, on the other hand, appreciate sharply on impact, with the peak 
response in the third quarter and are hack at the pre-shock level after six quarters. 
Finally, net exports increase on impact, significantly so in the second quarter after 
the shock and remain above trend for an extended period. Ibis finding is in line
is the sum o f government consumption expenditures (A933RC1) and gross government investment 
(A782HC1) deflated will) the deflator o f government consumption and investment (A822RD3), Real 
net taxes are taxes (W021RC1) less transfers (A0S4RC1) and subsidies (A107RCI) deflated with 
the GD P deflator (A191RD3). Real GDP is nominal GDP (AI91RC1) deflated with the GDP 
deflator (A191RD3). The terms o f trade are constructed as the price index o f imports (A021RD3) 
over the price index of exports (A020RD3). The trade balance is constructed as the ratio of 
exports (B020RC1) less imports (B021RC1) over GDP (A191RC1). The nominal and real effective 
exchange rates, which are taken from the IFS. are inverted such that an increase corresponds to 
a depreciation. The 10 year nominal interest rate is obtained from the FRED database o f the St. 
Louis Fed. Quarterly population figures are also provided by the NIPA tables (D23OHC0).
4The analysis of Canzoueri et al. (2003) is also based on this identifying assumption. The 
baseline specification of Kim and Roubini (2003), in contrast, is based on the assumption that GDP 
does not contempuranrausly respond to changes in the fiscal balance. However, Kim and Roubini 
perform various robustness tests, including the identification scheme used in the present paper. 
They find that the results are essentially unaltered. I also consider an alternative identification 
scheme below.
Perot ti (2005) shows that it may result from assuming a zero price elasticity of real government 
spending (in the present identification scheme) and that the effect becomes weaker if a non-zero 
elasticity is assumed. Linnemann and Schabert (2003) show in a clostxi economy model (hat the 
eiFert o f  government spending on the price level ultimately depends on the relative importance of 
the supply (i.e. wealth) effect and the demand effect (i.e. the degree of price rigidity).
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with tlit' results of Kim and Roubini regarding the current account.6
1.2.2 Robustness
In order to explore the robustness o f the results, different spocifi cat ions of the trend, 
the inclusion o f additional/alternative variables and an alternative identification 
scheme are considered. In the light of difficulties to distinguish clearly between sto­
chastic and deterministic trends on the basis of formal tests, Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) base their analysis on both specifications. Also, in case of stochastic trends 
it is hard to establish clear evidence in favor of cointegration where suggested by 
economic theory (as in the case of taxes and government spending). Clearly, in the 
present case where interest Ís not centered on the cointegration relationship it might 
he sensible to resort to the level specification which can accommodate for stochastic 
trends as well. Against this background, this paper follows Perotti (2005) and con­
siders the following alternatives to the baseline specification: i) quadratic trend; ii) 
levels; iii) stochastic trend;' and iv) a stochastic trend with cointegration between 
spending and taxes (for that purpose taxes are included in the VAR). The left column 
of Figure 2 displays the results for the variables of interest, where the shaded area 
gives the 95 percent confidence interval of the baseline specification (linear trend). 
For all specifications the qualitative predictions of the model are unchanged, except 
for the response of the terms of trade under the imposed cointegration relationship 
between government spending and taxes.
Next, variables that have been left out under the presumption that they do not 
affect the response of the variables o f interest to a temporary increase in government 
spending are included in the VAR. Additional variables are i) the 10-year nominal in­
terest rate; and ii) net taxes. For the identification of the exogenous spending shock, 
both variables are also assumed not to affect government spending contemporane­
ously. Alternative variables are iii) public spending deflated with the GDP deflator 
(instead of being deflated with its own deflator) and iv) the real exchange rate (in­
stead o f the nominal exchange rate). A last aspect concerns the identification of all 
exogenous shock to government spending. So far, a shock to government spending 
has been identified by the assumption that government spending does not contem­
poraneously respond to any other variables included in the VAR. This assumption 
may be somewhat restrictive with respect to the price level. Perotti (2U05) argues 
that depending on the degree of indexation of government spending, it might be 
reasonable to assume that real government spending falls if the price level increases. 
Only if government spending were fully (and without a lag) indexed to inflation, 
the zero restriction would be fully appealing. Therefore, this paper follows Perotti 
and considers the identification of an exogenous increase in government spending
' Baxter (1995) emphasizes that ihe trade balance and the current account display very similar 
short-run properties.
'First differences o f the variables are used in the regression and the accumulated impulse re­
sponses are reported. No allowance, however, is made for changes in the underlying drift as in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
(ffimilllP!
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based on the assumption that the price elasticity of real government spending is 
—0.5 (instead of zero in the baseline case). The right column of Figure 2 displays 
the results of all five experiments, which are well within the confidence bands of 
baseline specification.
Against this background, the dynamic effects of a temporary increase in F.S. 
government spending during the flexible exchange rate period 1973-2005 can be 
summarized as follows: the nominal exchange rate depreciates, the terms of trade 
appreciate and the trade balance improves.
1.3 The Model
To rationalize the evidence obtained from the VAR a two-country general equilibrium 
model is proposed.* Given the significant response of relative prices to an exoge­
nous increase in government spending, the response of the trade balance may rolled 
a reallocation of expenditure across home and foreign goods. The model therefore 
assumes that both countries supply distinct goods to the world market and gives 
a prominent role to the determinants of the intratemporal consumption allocation 
across these goods. Both countries are populate*! by a continuum of households 
which consume identical consumption goods within each country and provide differ­
entiated output goods. In setting prices for these goods, households are exogenously 
constraint a la Calvo. Fiscal policy is characterized by an exogenous process for 
government spending financed entirely through lump-sum taxes. It is assumed that 
while private consumption is home biased, government spending falls entirely on 
domestic goods. To close the model, monetary policy is characterized by an interest 
rate feedback rule. Moreover, two cases are distinguished, a case where financial 
markets are complete at the international level and one where only riskless assets 
are traded across countries. To simplify the exposition, only the home economy is 
considered and the following notation is used: foreign variables within the home 
economy are indexed with the subscript "F ", while foreign variables in foreign are 
indexed with a star.
1.3.1 I nt rate nip oral expenditure allocation
A generic home household /, with i £ [0, 1] , consumes a composite good, O/, and 
provides a differentiated good, Yi+A-(/), to the world market. The objective of the 
household is to maximize
E, j f > 1«  (C,+*) -  r  (V, ,*(»))] | . ( 1.1)
sThe inode] belongs to a class o f stochastic general equilibrium-models, which combine opti­
mization behavior at the micro-level with price stickiness to address problems o f the open economy, 
see. e.g. Henigno andBeni^no (2003). Chari. Kehoo and McGratten (2002) and Gall and Monacelli 
(2001).
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whore U < ¿3 <  1 is a discount factor. The period contribution of utility u is assumed 
to be concave and increasing. The period contribution o f disutility v is assumed to 
be convex and increasing. Ef denotes expectations conditional on the information 
set at date t. The composite good C* is an aggregate of home and foreign bundles 
of differentiated goods. C/fj and C pj, respectively, such that
Ct =
1r<clLt + (i -o)-'CFi
where s > 0 provides a measure for the infratemporal elasticity o f substitution 
between the home and foreign goods and 1/2 <  0 <  1 for the home bias in private 
consumption. Consequently, the domestic and foreign composite goods differ for all 
0 > 1/2. Home and foreign goods are bundled according to the CES technology
Ch,., = ( l  c„.
1 p_
C r j  =
where C u j(j)  and Cr,t{j) denote differentiated goods produced by household j  €  
[0, 1] in home and foreign, respectively, ft >  1 denotes the price elasticity of demand 
for differentiated output goods. En,t{j) and denote the price (denoted in
home currency) of domestic good j  and foreign good j, respectively. The price indices
for home and foreign good bundles are defined as Pm  =  ( fo  P m U )'-»< li) and 
Pj.j =  ^/J 1 ** ■ The domestic consumer price index is given by
P< =  [0P}u  + ( 1 - 0 )  P'fT ]  W  ^  ■ ( 1.2 )
Let St denote the nominal exchange rate, i.e. the price o f foreign currency in terms 
of domestic currency. While the law of one price holds, i.e.
St =  P iu lH u ’ 1.3)
purchasing power parity does not hold for 0 > 1/2. For future reference it is also 
useful to define the terms of trade as the relative price o f foreign goods to domestic 
goods
h  =  PF.t/Pm. H D
Since government spending. (7f, is assumed to fall entirely on domestic goods, an 
optimal allocation of expenditure implies that the demand for a generic home good, 
Ytn{j) .  is given by
ft°U )  = * [  ( t ^ )  £ (oc< + ( ! - « )  c <) +  Gf (1.5)
For future reference let V/ =  [io 0 ) ^  * denote the bundle of differentiated
goods produced in the home country, which corresponds to domestic output. Finally,
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the tratio balance, T B f, expressed in domestic consumer prices is defined as exports 
less imports
m P iu ( i  -o)c; P f j  {  Pr.t 
Pt V Pt (1 -0 )C t . (1.0)
1.3.2 Financial markets
Two difTeront structures o f financial markets are considered. In both cases financial 
markets are complete within countries. This assumption introduces homogeneity of 
households within a country with respect to consumption decisions as households can 
perfectly insure the risk resulting from the price setting decisions discussed below. 
However, in the first case, international financial markets are complete as well, while 
in the second case?, only non-state-contingent assets are trailed across countries.
In the first case, financial markets are complete, both at the domestic and the 
international level anil the set of state-contingent assets is denoted in domestic cur­
rency. The absence of arbitrage opportunities requires that there exists a stochastic 
discount factor + i which is used to price the portfolio A m  in period tr The 
budget constraint o f a representative home household is then given by
P(Ct +  Et {Qf,f+idf+i } -f Tt =  At -t- PnjYtt
where Tt denotes lump sum taxes. The maximization of (1.1) subject to (1.7) gives
u'(Cw ) Pt 
'  u'{Ct) PH i ( 1.8 )
which holds in each possible state. Defining the short-term nominal interest rate as 
lit 1 =  Ft { Q u q }  and taking expectations of (1.8) gives the Killer equation
M Q -n) pt }
X u'(ct) a+ i j
-it (1.9)
As analogous relationships hold for the foreign economy, one obtains the risk sharing 
condition
«'(('’,)■ a.io)
where k is a constant, see Chari, Kehoe and McCJrattan (20U2). Intuitively, the 
assumption of complete international asset markets induces perfect risk-sharing 
such that the marginal utility of consumption, weighted by the real exchange rate,
J As discussed in Woodford (2003, Ch. 2). /h+ i denotes the state-contingent value o f the house­
hold portfolio at the beginning o f period t + l. Thus, at the time of the portfolio decision A(*i 
is a random variable, but the household chooses its complete specification, he. the return in each 
stale. As o f date ƒ. remains also a random variable and depends of the realization of the
state in t +  1. To simplify the notation, the state dependence of these variables is omitted, as in 
Gali and Moiiaeelli (2001). An explicit treatment o f state-dependence is given by Chari. Kehoe and 
McGratten (2002),
wilkittiMMi>kttMiii«!iialiit
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StPt* /Ift, is equalized across countries. If home and foreign goods have equal weight 
in private consumption, purchasing power parity holds, the real exchange rate is 
constant and consumption is equal across countries. If 0 >  1/2, an increase in the 
price of domestic goods induces ceteris paribus an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate and roqilire's that the domestic cons\unption level falls relative to foreign in 
order for ( 1.10) to hold.
In tlie second case, international financial markets are incomplete, such that only 
riskless one-period bonds are traded across countries. As in Benigno (2001), house­
holds can allocate their wealth between a bond denominated in domestic currency, 
Bju< and one denominated in foreign currency, B pj. In order to ensure stationarity, 
a home household faces portfolio costs which are proportional to the position in the 
bond denominated in foreign currency, ^i/(‘2Pt), as discussed in Schmitt-
Grolie and Uribe (2003). The budget constraint o f a representative home household 
is given by
V ] ';'11 + + f.V,/??..„, + P,C, + T, =  BUJ +  SiBfj + r ,u Y,. ( 1. 11)
Maximization of ( 1.1) with respect to ( 1.11) also implies the Euler equation (1.9), but 
instead of the complete risk-sharing condition ( 1.10), the solution to the household 
problem with respect to foreign bond holdings now requires that
1 +  V’/ V . h i
R l »mhm
In the following, it is assumed that bonds denominated in domestic currency are in 
zero net supply within the homo country.
1.3.3 Price setting
Given monopolistic competition in the goods market and the resulting downward 
sloping demand functions, the price setting mechanism plays a crucial role for the 
real allocation of goods. It is assumed that price setting is constraint exogenously 
by a discrete time version of the mechanism suggested by Calvo (1983). In each 
period a generic household j  has the opportunity to change its price with a given 
probability 1 — o , independently o f previous price adjustments. If allowed to set a 
new price Phj (j) in period t the household takes Pf, Pj\t,Pn,t as given and seeks to 
maximize
(j) Y »k(j) -  v(Y,°kV)) )  .
H o  1 / , + ‘  >
subject to the demand function (1.5). Afj+k denotes the intertemporal marginal 
rate of substitution. Note that revenues Pu t (j)  Yt^ k(j)  are evaluated using the 
marginal utility of income -(¿'(C^*)//* +*, which is identical to all households as a
8!
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result of complete income insurance within the country. The first ortler condition to 
tliis problem is given by
El f > * A  tMky,lh U )  {  F l"  0;>)|" '(Cm-  -  ^ Tyf'(y,?*(j))} =  o. (1.13)
Note that if prices are fully flexible, i.e. a  =  0. condition (2.5) implies that the price 
P ilj (j ) is set such that
i ’n,tU)/Pt = (/</(/<-1 ))f'(r ,"(j))M c,).
1.3.4 Policy
The government budget is balanced in each period, i.e. 7} =  PjjjG f, and government 
spending follows an exogenous A R (1) process
Gt/G =  {Gt-i/ G )pexput, (1-1-1)
where letters without time-subscript refer to steady state values. For future refer­
ence, let y  =  G/Y  denote the steady state share o f government spending. Monetary 
policy Ís characterized by an interest feedback rule such that the nominal interest 
rate is adjusted in response to inflation and the output gap,
It ,/R  =  ( P i/P ,.{ f -  { Y t / Y / y * , (1.15)
where Y/ denotes output that would prevail if prices were fully flexible.
1.3.5 Equilibrium
Given an initial allocation o f Bp.o, an exogenous process for government spending 
Gf and the flex-price output Y /, an equilibrium for the economy is defined by a 
sequence for domestic producer price inflation. Pjjj jP ju~\, foreign producer price 
inflation, Pfj!  Pfj~\, consumer price inflation, Pt/Pt-i, the nominal interest rate, 
lit, consumption, C/, actual output. V), as well as their foreign counterparts. In 
addition, a path for the nominal exchange rate. Ay, the terms of trade, Tf, the trade 
balance, TBt and the stock o f debt, Bpj defines the equilibrium.
These sequences have to satisfy the following conditions both in home and for­
eign: the Euler equation (1.9) and the appropriate non-Ponzi games and transver- 
sality conditions, the first order condition for price setting (1.13), the definition of 
consumer pi'ice inflation implied by (1.2), the law of one price (1.3) and the good- 
market clearing conditions and the interest rate feedback rule (1.15). In addition, 
the definition of the trade balance (1.6) and the terms of trade ( 1. 1) are used to 
characterize the equilibrium. Finally, under complete financial markets the xïskless 
asset is redundant and the risk sharing condition (1.1 U) is required to hold, whereas
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under incomplete financial markets the domestic budget constraint (1.11) and con­
dition (1.12) determine the equilibrium allocation. The model will be analyzed in
a form log-linearized around a deterministic steady state characterized by balanced 
trade and a zero net foreign asset position, see the appendix for details.
Vi
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1.4 Government spending and foreign trade
Turning to the solution of the linearized model, note first that, unless defined oth­
erwise, small letters are used to denote log-deviations from steady state. In order to 
investigate the transmission channels o f fiscal shocks as well as the role o f monetary 
policy for the equilibrium outcome analytical expressions will be derived under sim­
plifying assumptions in the next subsection. These will be relaxed afterwards when 
the model is solved numérica Hy.
1.4.1 Some analytical insights
A natural benchmark for the equilibrium outcome is given by the allocation that 
would prevail under flexible prices. Benigno and Benigno (2003) show that such an 
allocation is the equilibrium outcome in a two country model if monetary policy, 
both in home and foreign, maintains producer price stability. In the following, this 
allocation is referee! to by means of a superscript "f". In this case households will 
have no incentive to adjust their prices in response to shocks occurring at the country 
level. The adjustment to shocks is achieved entirely through an adjustment of the 
nominal exchange rate.10 The following statement summarizes this result. The 
derivation is given in the appendix together with the other results that follow.
R esult 1 (F lexible price  a llocation ) If international financial markets are 
complete and monetary policy maintains producer pnce stability in both countries, 
an exogenous increase in domestic government spending induces a fall in the terms 
of trade and the nominal exchange rate by the same amount t{  — s{ =  — {g ¡0  ht-
Note that £ is a positive ("oustant which increases in the intertemporal elasticity 
of the supply of differentiated output, uj. as well as in the intra- and intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution, er and s, respectively, see expression (1.31) in the appendix. 
A fall in the terms of trade reflects an increase in the price of domestic goods relative 
to foreign goods. Intuitively, this is the consequence of the home bias in government 
spending. Note that this home bias need not be complete as in the present model, 
see, e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (19!)4). Moreover, if the provision of output 
is costly (low lj) and the elasticities of substitution are low (low a and s), a larger 
res]>ouse of the terms of trade (low £) is required in order to induce a reallocation 
of resources in response to an exogenous increase in government spending.
Result 1 characterizes the flex-price allocation and provides a henchí nark for an 
evaluation of the response of the terms of trade in case monetary policy does not
luNole (hat tliis mechanism constitutes the case for flexible exchange rates in Friedman (1953).
I
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maintain producer price stability, but instead is characterized by an interest rate 
feedback rule. For the moment it is convenient to assume that the interest rates 
are not adjusted in response to the output gap, i.e. that 0y =  0 in equation (3.13). 
Moreover, it is assumed that monetary policy adjusts the nominal interest rate in 
response to producer price inflation instead of consumer price inflation, bet o  
denotes the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to producer price inflation 
and k the slope of the Now Keynesian Phillips curve derived from the linearized 
price setting problem (1.13). Then one obtains the following restilt.
R esu lt 2 (Sticky p rice  a llocation ) If international financial marke ts arc com­
plete and monetary policy adjusts the interest rate in response to producer price 
inflation, both in home and in foreign, the equilibrium is determinate if 0n > 1. 
If, in addition, government spending shocks display no persistence (p =  0) ,  an ex­
ogenous increase in domestic government spending induces a fall in the terms o f  
trade that is smaller than in the flex price case (and identical for 0 n —* oo): 
rt =  — [g/ (£ +  uj/ (kc/)^))] gf . The nominal exchange rate displays a unit root: it 
depreciates in the long run, but undershoots on impact (see appendix).
Intuitively, monetary policy by adjusting interest rates in response to producer 
price inflation, is somewhat accommodating in the home country relative to the 
benchmark case where producer price stability is maintained. This is reflected in 
the path of the nominal exchange rate. A measure for the monetary stance during 
the transmission of fiscal shocks is provided by the natural interest rate, i.e. the real 
interest rate that is consistent with the flex price allocation, see Woodford (2003, p, 
218). Therefore it is instructive to solve for the difference in the real interest rate 
between home and foreign and compare this actual interest rate differential with the 
natural interest rate differential. It is shown in the appendix that the actual interest 
rate differential, (20 — 1) [<//(£ +  u f  (k^ ) ) ]  gt, is smaller than the natural interest 
rate differential, (20 — 1) (g/Odt^ except for epw —> oo. Home monet ary policy is 
thus accommodating for the fiscal shock as it prevents the real rate differential from 
increasing to the same extent as in the flexible price allocation. Note also that in 
the absence of home bias. 0 =  1/ 2. the interest rate differential is zero, as in this 
case consumption patters are identical in both countries.
While an increase in domestic government spending unambiguously increases 
the prices of home goods relative to foreign goods, the response of the trade balance 
eventually depends on the relative size o f the inter- and intratemporal elasticity of 
substitution, ej and s, respectively, and the degree o f home bias in private consump­
tion, 0. This is established in the following result.
R esu lt  3 (Trade ba lan ce) If international financial markets an complete and 
government spending shocks display no persistence (p =  0 ) , the response o f the trade 
balance to ein exogenous increase in domestic, government spending is positive if 
1 +  (20 — 1) er >  20s. This is true for both the flexible eind the sticky price allocation.
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It( yarding the later ease, the weaker the response o f  monetary policy to producer price 
inflation, the weaker the response o f the trade balance. The response is strongest in 
case o f  producer price stability (flexible price allocation).
To understand tin? condition for an increase in the trade balance, l +  (20 — 1) o  >  
'IQs. note that three channels determine the response of the trade balance: i) a value 
channel - if domestic goods become more expensive relative to foreign the value o f 
exports increases and the value o f imports falls; ii) a risk-sharing channel - the term 
{'10 — 1)<7 determines the consumption differential induced by changes in the terms 
of trade under efficient risk-sharing (approximation to equation (1,10)). If private 
consumption is home bias«l and domestic goods become more expensive relative 
to foreign, efficiency requires that the domestic consumption level falls relative to 
foreign. The stronger the home bias and the intertemporal elasticity of substitu­
tion, the larger the fall in the domestic consumption level relative to foreign, and 
eventually the amount of resources transferred from home to foreign; iii) a substitu­
tion channel - the term 2Os reflects that the com.po.si/fo7/. of consumption goods also 
changes in response to a terms of trade appreciation. The higher the home bias anti 
the higher the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, the stronger the expenditure 
switching from home to foreign goods.
While an increase in the relative price of domestic goods has a positive effect 
on the trade balance through the value and the risk-sharing channel, it lias a neg­
ative effect through the substitution channel. Hence, if the effects working through 
the first two channels dominate the third, the trade balance increases. Note, that 
home bias in private consumption amplifies both the working of the risk-sharing 
channel and the substitution channel. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitu­
tion, a. exceeds the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, s, home and foreign 
goods are Edgeworth-1 W e to complements.11 In this case the home bias will have a 
stronger cfic'ct on the risk-sharing channel than on the substitution channel. As a 
consequence, if home and foreign goods are complements, an increase in government 
spending may reduce the trade balance if the home bias in private consumption is 
small, while the opposite holds for a large home bias in private consumption.1“
It is useful to relate Result 3 to similar results regarding the international trans­
mission of monetary policy. Tille (2001) considers an economy with incomplete 
financial markets and without home bias. In this case the sign of the response o f 
the trade balance to a monetary shock depends on the intratemporal elasticity o f 
substitution only, with one being the critical value. Gall and Monaeelli (2004) dis­
cuss the sign of the relationship between the terms of trade and the trade balance 
in a small open economy model with complete financial markets and home bias in 
private consumption. However, the asymmetry between the small open economy 
and the rest of the world changes the effect of homo bias on the risk-sharing channel 
and the substitution effects. If the elasticity of substitution across different foreign
11 See the discussion in Corsetli and Pesenti (2001) and for a formal derivation Svenssou (1987).
12 An example is given by o — 5 /2 and t  =  3 /2 . In this case the t rade balance increases if 0 = 9/10, 
while it falls for 9 =  6/10.
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goods is unity, the trade balance will increase with a terms of trade appreciation 
if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exceeds the intratemporal elasticity 
(Edgeworth-Pareto complements). In contrast to the present model, the degree o f  
home bias does not affect the sign of the trade balance under this assumption.
Note finally that the sign of the response of the trade balance to an government 
spending shock does not depend on the monetary regime. However, the monetary 
regime matters for the strength of the response of the terms of trade and therefore 
indirectly for the quantitative effect of government spending on the trade balance. 
An accommodating monetary policy dampens the effect of a government spending 
shock on the trade balance.
1.4.2 Numerical analysis
So far, the analysis has been limited by the assumption that i) government spending 
shocks are not persistent, ii) international financial markets are complete and iii) the 
nominal interest rate is adjusted only in response to producer price inflation. These 
assumptions may appear somewhat restrictive, given that the fiscal shock identified 
in the data displays a high degree of persistence, that complete financial markets 
provide full insurance against country-specific shocks and that monetary policy is 
often characterized by an interest rate feedback rule that responds to consumer price 
inflation and the output gap. Therefore, the paper investigates whether the above 
results also hold for persistent shocks to government spending, incomplete financial 
markets and a characterization of monetary policy by the Taylor rule. The model is 
solved numerically on the basis o f the generalized Scliur decomposition as discussed 
in Klein (2000).
Before turning to the results, parameter values have to be assigned. A time 
period in the model corresponds to one quarter and ¡5 is set to 0.99. The share of 
government spending is fixed at 20 percent, the long-run average in the data. The 
degree of autocorrelation in public spending is set to p — 0.9, which is suitable to 
capture the persistence of the spending shock identified in the VAR. The share of 
imports in U.S. GDP is approximately 10 percent in the period 1973 - 2003. Given 
that government spending falls only on domestic goods in the model, this implies 
0 =  0.875. The intertemporal elasticity o f labor supply is fixed at unity which is 
somewhere in the middle o f the wide range of the values discussed in the literature, 
see, e.g. Burnside et al. (2001). The price elasticity o f demand ft is set to six. 
implying a steady state mark-up of 10 percent. Regarding the the average frequency 
of price adjustments, a  is set to 0.75 which implies that prices are adjusted on average 
once a year. To parametrize portfolio costs yt is set to 0.0071. as in Schmitt-Grohe 
and Uribe (2003). The coefficients in the interest rate feedback rule (1.15) are set 
to 0^ =  1.51 and 0y =  0.77/4, i.e. the estimates by Taylor (1993).
In the presence of home bias in private consumption, the relative size of the 
inter- and infratemporal elasticity of substitution is the key to the response of the 
trade balance. Unfortunately, there is substantial uncertainty regarding appropriate
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values for these elasticities. Regarding the intratemporal elasticity of substitution. s, 
takes a value o f 0.9 (baseline) corresponding to the estimate reported by Ileathcote 
and Pern (2002). It is also close to the unit elasticity used in Stockman and Tesar 
(1995) and Corsetti and IVsenti (2001 ).1S Note, however, that Obstfeld and RogofF 
(2000) assume a value of six. Given the central role o f this parameter, results 
for the trade balance for e =  1.5 are reported as well. This corrcponds to the 
baseline value in Backus et al. (1991). The intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
is assumed to be 1.33, a value slightly above the frequently used unit elasticity. Note, 
however, that Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) estimate the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution to be around G. while Patterson and Pesaran (1992) report a value 
of 0.2.
Figure 3 displays the response of key variables to a temporary increase in govern­
ment spending. In the baseline case international financial markets are incomplete, 
monetary policy follows a lay  lor rule and the intertemporal elasticity of substitu­
tion exceeds the intratemporal elasticity of substitution such that home and foreign 
goods are Edgeworth-Pareto complements (solid line). Three alternatives are con­
sidered, where, in turn, one feature of the baseline case is altered. First, in order 
to assess t ue role of monetary policy, the case of producer price stability is consid­
ered. Note that, as argued above, the resulting allocation would prevail under price 
flexibility (doted line). Next, in order to assess the role o f international financial 
markets, the case of complete risk sharing across both countries is considered as well 
(broken line). Using this assumption the analytical results have been derived above. 
Finally, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is set to 1.5 such that it exceeds 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (starred line).
The exogenous shock to government spending is displayed in panel a). Panel 
b) shows the response of output with an impact multiplier o f around 0.7. This is 
quantitatively within the range of what is found in the data. Consumer prices fall 
on impact but increase from the second quarter onwards (panel c)). In the case 
of producer price stability, the consumer price level falls throughout as a result o f 
complete exchange rate pass-through. A comparison of the baseline response and 
response in the price stability case indicates that the Taylor rule implies a relatively 
accommodating monetary policy stance. It also depreciates the nominal exchange 
rate and the terms of trade rrlative to the flexible price allocation (panel d) and e)). 
In absolute terms the nominal exchange rate depreciates after 12 quarters in all cases 
except the price stability case. Finally, in all cases except where the intratemporal 
elasticity of substitution takes the value of s =  1.5, net exports increase in response 
to a government spending shock (panel f)).
Hence, the numerical analysis confirms the analytical results derived above. In 
addition, it illustrates that relaxing the assumption of complete financial markets 
docs not alter the results derived under complete risk sharing. The role of monetary 13
13Note that (-ole ami Ohstfelil (1991) show that under the assumption of a unit elasticity be­
tween home ami foreign goods the structure o f international asset markets does not matter for the 
equilibrium outcome.
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policy as accommodating relative to the flexible price allocation is confirmed as well 
as the role of size o f the intra- and intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the 
response of the trade balance. Finally, comparing the VAR responses (figure 1) and 
the model responses (figure 3) reveals that the model lacks the ability to match 
quantitatively the VAR responses of the variables o f interest, while it goes some way 
in accounting for the responses in a qualitative way.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper has tried to establish empirically the dynamic effects of an exogenous 
increase in government spending on the nominal exchange rate, the terms of trade* 
and the* trade balance. The main finding proves to be robust across various VAR 
specifications: the exchange rate depreciates, the terms of trade appreciate and 
the trade balance moves into surplus after an exogenous increase in government 
spending.
The strong and significant responses o f the terms of trade provide a guideline 
for the theoretical exploration o f the empirical findings. Specifically, the paper in­
vestigated whether a stochastic general equilibrium model with price rigidities can 
account for the evidence, and if so under what conditions. It turns out that, in­
dependently of the monetary stance during the transmission process, an exogenous 
increase in government spending increases the trade balance if both the intertempo­
ral elasticity of substitution exceeds the intratemporal elasticity o f substitution and 
there is a strong home bias in private consumption. The reason is as follows: under 
the assumption that government spending falls entirely on home goods, an increase 
in government spending induces an appreciation in the terms of trade such that 
home goods become more expensive relative to foreign goods. In the presence of 
home bias and complete risk sharing, a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
induces a large fall in the domestic level o f consumption relative to foreign, while 
a low intertemporal elasticity o f substitution induces only small substitution effects 
from home to foreign goods. Ilence, resource»« are transferred from home to foreign 
and net exports increase.
Monetary policy, which is characterized by an interest rate feedback rule, does 
not alter but dampens the effect on net exports, because it accommodates the in­
crease in government spending relative to the flexible price allocation, A loose 
monetary stance is also reflected in the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
This interpretation of the dynamic effects of government spending on foreign 
trade, allows to draw a tentative conclusion regarding the recent F.S. fiscal expan­
sion. Contrary to widely held views, an exogenous increase in government spending 
may not have necessarily contributed to the U.S. trade deficit.14 On the other hand,
14Using a richer calibrated two-country model, breeg. Gucrrieri ami Gust (200-j) also find that 
while the rerent stimulative fiscal policy in the U.S. may have contributed to the trade deficit, its 
quantitative role have been quite modest. Also Kollmann (1998) comparing the role o f fiscal policy 
and productivity in determining the U.S. trade balance from 197o to 1991 finds a very limited role
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a fairly accommodating monetary policy may have reduced the possible positive ef­
fects on the trade balance. Hence, the current and also former episodes in U.S. time 
series when high government spending and trade deficits occurred simultaneously 
may not simply stem from expansionary fiscal policy. Alternative explanations may 
instead focus on endogenous components in fiscal policy. Also the recent U.S. fiscal 
expansion is in large parts the result o f tax cuts, which have not been investigated in 
the present paper. Further investigations into these issues appear to bo promising.
Moreover, while the degree o f home bias in private consumption may be cali­
brated confidently using first moments o f the data, there is little agreement in the 
literature regarding the relative size of the intra- and intratemporal elasticities of 
substitution. Finally, it may be instructive to establish more evidence using data 
for smaller countries, where government spending may have little impact on the 
terms of trade. Lane and Perotti ( ’2003), for example, use a small country model 
and suggest that fiscal expansions induce a loss in competitiveness as costs increase 
while prices are fixed on world markets. In this scenario, a trade deficit rather than 
a surplus might be the effect of a fiscal expansion.
for government spending.
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1.6 Appendix
Log-linearized  m odel Small letters denote the log-deviation of a variable from its 
steady state value, where the latter is referred to by dropping the subscript " t ", Given 
an initial steady state with balanced trade and a zero net foreign asset position, an 
exogenous process for domestic government spending gt and the ilex-price output 
levels y {  and y (* , the following sequence is considered:
~ ftF.h ^ t' rf' Tt ’ c t iCi '  Vt-tUt ' A S f.T j, tbf,  *
where 7Tt =  lo g ( /y P ,_  i), r t =  log{Pfj/I}i u )< tin =  THt/Y and bFj+] =  HFJ/Y. It 
satisfies the following conditions/defmitions. First, symmetric conditions in home 
and foreign are considered. The Euler equation (1.9) and its foreign equivalent 
approximated by
ct =  E(Ct , i -  <7(7-, -  F ttt/ f  1). c] -  F tej+ ] -  <r(rf* -  F ,tt*a j ), (1.1 fi)
where <7 =  —u,/u,,C  measures the intertemporal elasticity substitution. A log-linear 
approximation to (1.13) gives a variant o f the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
7T//,7 =  Æ£/*■!/,«H + «  (( 1 — 0) r t +  WJ// +  ere,) , (1.17)
~  /3L/7T/.y_|. 1 +  K (— (1 — 0) Tt +  wyt + ? (1-18)
where K =  (1 — a) (1 — a£f) / ( cv( 1 + f u j ) )  and w =  v (/v"11  measures the intertemporal 
elasticity of supply of differentiated output. Consumer price inflation implied by 
( 1.2) is approximated as
— OtThj +  (1 — 0)~FJ< 7T* — 07T*jrt -f (1 — 0 ) 77) 1 .^ (1-19)
Linearizing the law of one price (1.3) and taking first differences gives
TT ƒƒ,/ =  A  S( +  K F,t — A  Sf +  TT*r t . (1-20)
Idle good market clearing conditions are approximated as
Vt =  0 (1 -  g) ct +  (1 -  9) (1 -  g) c* +  ggt *4* ‘2s0 (1 -  g) (1 -  0)r t . ( 1.21) 
Vt =  « (1 - ^ ) c ;  +  (1 - 2 ^ (1  -£ ,) (1 - 1?)^,. (1.22)
The interest rate feedback rules (1.15) can be conveniently written as
rt =  <vTi +  0 y (yt -  y Q  , r*t =  0X-* +  0y (yi -  , (1.23)
A second set of conditions/defmitions reflects the interdependence between home 
and foreign. The trade balance (l.G) is approximated as
( 1 - 0 )  ( 1 - i r i
t b t = C > s O - \ ) T t - ( c t ~C*t ) (1.24)
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and the terms of trade (1.4) imply the following log-linear dynamic relationship
Tt =  Tt- i  +  TTp-.t — 7T//./. (1.25)
Finally, under complete international Financial markets an approximation to the 
cross-country risk sharing condition (1.10) has to hold and the risk-less bond is 
redundant,
(ct -c*t ) =  a  (20 -  1) r , , bFJ =  0. (1.26)
On the other hand, if international financial markets are incomplete, the linearized 
domestic budget constraint (1.11) serves to characterize the equilibrium
/^F,f 41 =  bF,t +  Vt ~  (1 -  <j) ct -  ggt -  (1 -  g) (1 -  0) r ,, ( 1.27)
as well as the condition
rt -  = Ast +1 -  tl'Ybrj. f i, ( 1.28 )
obtained from linearizing (1.12) and subtracting the linearized Huler equation (1.9). 
The budget constraint of the foreign country is redundant by Walras1 law.
R esult 1 (F lexible price a llocation ) Formally, producer price stability im­
plies that instead of (1.23) the following holds
- / / ,f= 0, 7T>., =0. (1.29)
Imposing these conditions on (1.17) and (1.18), respectively, and subtracting gives
0 =  2 (1 -  0) t{  +  w - :ly (n +  e e l ” , (1.30)
where a superscript "D" denotes the difference between home and foreign. Imposing 
the risk-sharing condition (1.20) gives
J P  „  ƒyt — Tt . (1.31)
Subtracting the goodmarket clearing condition for the foreign good (1.22) from its 
home counterpart (1.21) and imposing the risk-sharing condition (1.2G) gives
y { D =  [ k < H l - ; / ) ( l - f l )  +  < n 2 0 - l ) 2 ( l - 9 ) ] r /  + ggt. (1.32)
Combining (1.31) and (1.32) gives the solution for the terms of trade in the flex-price
case
t {  =  - f  g„ (1.33)
S
where
Ç = w + AsO (1 — g) (1 — 0) + cr (20 — 1) (1 — g) (1-34)
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is unambiguously positive. Extending (1-3) with P}jj  and considering log-deviations 
gives
s t =  r t +  pu j -  p*Ft - ( 1 • 35 )
sudi that in the price stability case, the nominal exchange rate displays the same 
dynamics as the terms o f trade
sf  _t ~ (1.3G)
To solve for the natural interest rate differential, i.o. difference in the real interest 
rate between home and foreign. I subtract the foreign Euler equation from home 
(1.39) , impose risk sharing condition (1.26) and the fact that Etyt+1 =  0 together 
with (1.36) in order to obtain
r{ =  (20 -  1) j g t . (1.37)
Result 2 (Sticky price allocation) Monetary policy is characterized by the 
feedback rule
rt =  àvirH'h r* =  é ^ * Ft. (1.38)
Taking the difference of the Euler equations (1.16) and imposing the risk sharing 
condition (1.26) and together with (1.38) gives
Tt. 4- =  E t r n  i +  i • ( 1 .3 9 )
Subtracting the Phillips Curves (1.18) and (1.17) from each other and imposing the 
risk sharing (1.26) and the goodsmarket clearing conditions (1.21) ,(1.22) gives
=  &Eticp+1 +  -1- K v '1ggt, ( i ..JO)
where ¿rf* =  tthj — TT*Ft denotes the difference between home and foreign producer 
price inflation. Equations (1.39) and (1.10) define a linear system of expoctational 
difTe rencc equations with two endogenous forward-looking variables
' 1 1o
=  :.4
E t * l l  1
E tT t+1
1
— KUJ
“ V—
=:B
7TD
Tt
=:C
( 1- 11)
If both eigenvalues of =  A ~l li are outside the unit circle the rational expecta­
tions equilibrium is determinate. This will be the case if <pn exceeds unity. To see 
this note that
d etil 1 =  (l +  ¡¡3 and tr Q 1 =  1 +  (l +  kuj *£) /$ (1.12)
such that, if > 1,
det Q " 1 +  tr i l -1 >  —1 and d e t il-1 — tr >  —1, (1.13)
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which is a sufficient for both eigenvalues being outside the unit circle, set* Woodford 
(2003. Add. to Ch. 1). In a closed economy the condition 6 W >  1 lias bt*en identifietl 
as the Taylor principle, see Woodford (2001). Rewriting (1.41) as
r i" , = QEt r -D l" , + irt . r i+i  . “ I'9t (1*44)
where T :=  D  ]C\ and solving forward using the law of iterated expectations and 
the properties of i l _1 (implying lim r— to =  0). gives
Tt
=  - £ i 2 * r  E ,{g Hk}
k~ 0
(1.45)
ruder the assumption that there is no persistence in the exogenous shock, i.e. if 
(> =  0, the solution for the producer price inflation differential and the terms of trade 
is given by
r td i - T a  -  ™ ~ '9 1Tt ”  i9ï ^K J’ l i + 1 . “ <^ r . 1.4G)
Rewriting gives for the terms of trade
Ti =  - 9
£ +  w/ ( « 0^ )^ (1*47)
Next, consider the response of the nominal exchange rate. Taking the first dif­
ference of (1.35) gives
As, =  T ,  -  r , _ ! + 7r f . ( 1.48)
Using the solution for the inflation differential and the terms of trade and the fact 
that the economy is initially in steady state, the initial response of the exchange 
rate, .s j , to a spending shock is given by
à* ~  1 9
<t>n £ + w/{K0v)91'
( 1 . 4 9 )
whereas from the second period onwards it stays permanently at the new level
- _  1 9
<t>* Ç +  u l{K à „)91'
(1.50)
To solve for the interest rate differential, rt. first consider the difference in con­
sumer price inflation, given by
7TDt =  OtîHJ +  ( 1  —  — ( 1  -  0) n*H t — 07T*Fj , (1.51)
substitute for foreign consumer price inflation using the law o f one price ( 1 .20) and 
for the nominal exchange rate using (1.48) to obtain
7T,n  =  i f  +  2 ( l - 0 ) A r , .  ( 1 . 5 2 )
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The real interest rate differential is given by the difference in the nominal inter­
est rates less the difference in the expected consumer price inflation. Given that 
+ i =  0 anti Et.Tt+i =  0 this implies after substituting for 7TjP and t /
(2# — 1)
(1.53)
R esult 3 (Trade ba lan ce) First, consider the flex price allocation. Imposing 
(1.2G) and (1.33) on (1.24) gives
1
( l - ô ) \ l - g ) tbt =  1(20 -  +  1 -  *°\ \m-
In the sticky price case, imposing (1.26) and (1.47) on (1.21) gives
( l - 0 ) ( l - g ) tb> =  [(29 -  1)«7 +  1 -  2r9] ( —  9 (1.55)\£ +  w/ {k0 „)J
lÉÉÉÉBMltfMMilHaiH!
Figure 1: Dynamic Effects of U.S. Government Spending Shock
a )  go v ern m en t sp e n d in g b) ou tpu t
Legend: VAR-based impulse responses to a one percent increase in government spending (1973:1-2003:4). 
Shaded areas indicate bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals. Vertical axes indicate 
deviations from unshocked path. Net exports: percentage points of GDP. Other variables: percent. 
Horizontal axes indicate quarters.
i
Figure 2: Robustness of VAR-Results
d) e x c h a n g e  r a te
3
5 10 15
b) te r m s  o f  t r a d e
20
10 15 20
—  in te re st  rate  
—h - g d p  deflator •
—  t a x e s  > 
r e a l  ex . rate  * 
p r ic e  e la st. ?
5 10 15
e) te rm s o f  t r a d e
20
Legend: VAR-based impulse responses to a one percent increase in government spending (1973:1-2003:4), 
Shaded areas indicate bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals.Panel a)-c): alternative 
trend specefications. Panel d)-f): alternative/additional variables in VAR.
Figure 3: Effects of Spending Shock in Two-Country Model
a )  go v ern m en t sp e n d in g  b) ou tp u t
legend: Model based impulse responses to a one percent increase in government spending. Vertical axes 
indicate deviations from steady state. Net exports: percentage points of steady state output.
Other variables: percent. Horizontal axes indicate quarters.
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Chapter 2
Fleshing out the Monetary 
Transmission Mechanism:
Output Composition and the 
Role of Financial Frictions (with 
André Meier) I
2.1 Introduction
Tht' last two dt'cadcs have scvn a tremendous body of work attempting to charac­
terize empirically the transmission of monetary policy shocks based on structural 
Vector Auto regressions (VAR). In light of the contributions by Christiano, Eichen- 
banni and Evans (1999). Woodford (21)03) and others, it seems fair to speak of an 
emerging consensus on the basic pattern of the economy’s response to a monetary 
policy shock. Nonetheless, the precise channels o f transmission and their relative 
importance have remained a topic o f debate. In particular, it is largely unclear 
whether or not there is a significant channel of transmission above and beyond the 
classical interest rate channel. One serious candidate is provided by the literature 
on financial frictions. In fact, imperfect information in loan markets can make 
borrowing conditions a function of borrowers' net worth, giving rise to a "balance 
sheet channel" that tends to reinforce the impact of a given monetary shock. A 
formal model of such a "financial accelerator" was provided by Iiernanke. G or tier 
and Gilchrist (1999), henceforth BGG. Despite some suggestive evidence, however, 
the quantitative relevance of this feature is still an open question.
In the present paper, we thus focus on the role of financial frictions for the re­
sponses of output, consumption and investment to a monetary policy shock. Specif­
ically, we start from the VAR-based evidence and relate it to the predictions of 
a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with nominal rigidities.
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Our model encompasses several features that are commonly considered in the liter­
ature but additionally allows for financial frictions in line with BOG. We take this 
model to the data using a minimum distance strategy similar to Rotemborg and 
Woodford (1997) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). henceforth CEE.
Our motivation is twofold. First, given the profession's interest to work with 
empirically successful yet parsimonious models, it is a critical task to establish the 
relative importance of different features on the real side and on the nominal side 
o f New Keynesian models. For an example of the latter, consider the challenge o f  
establishing whether nominal rigidities are more relevant in wage setting or in price 
setting, as lias been investigated, for example, by CEE. On the real side, the financial 
accelerator is but one of the features that should be examined more thoroughly. As 
Woodford (2003. p .l l )  puts it, "there is no substitute for careful empirical research to 
flesh out the details of a quantitatively realistic account of the monetary transmission 
mechanism." Second, better insights into the nature of monetary transmission have 
obvious benefits for policy-making. In this context, the microfoundations of the 
financial sector may seem o f particularly topical importance insofar as the new Basel 
Capital Accord is expected to affect the sensitivity of financing costs with respect 
to the borrower’s balance sheet quality.
Given that economic interest centrally bears on the impulse responses associated 
with a monetary policy shock, it is natural to consider this statistic as the critical 
nexus between theory and data. Consequently, we seek to obtain estimates for 
the structural parameters o f our model by matching the impulse response functions 
estimated from US data (1980:1-2003:4) with those implied by the model.
The idea of estimating a DSGE model with a minimum distance approach goes 
back to Ilotemberg and Woodford (1997).1 Their small-scale New Keynesian model 
included only output, inflation and the nominal interest rate. The model was subse­
quently extended by Amato and Laubach (2003), who also included wage inflation; 
Boivin and Giannoni (2003), who allowed for the indexation of prices; and Giannoni 
anti Woodford (2003). who combined both assumptions. CEE use a medium-scale 
model that incorporates price and wage rigidities and also allows for a richer spec­
ification of the real side o f the economy, taking investment and capital utilization 
into account.
In contrast to CEE. we highlight the possible role o f financial frictions in the 
transmission of monetary policy shocks. In doing so, we rely on the theoretical work 
o f BGG who introduced a financial accelerator into the DSGE framework. Because 
financial frictions have distinct implications for the behavior of individual output 
components, our analysis considers not only aggregate output, as lias been common 
practice in the literature, but also looks at the specific responses of consumption and 
investment. Indeed, compositional effects are likely to contain important information
'Som e alternative ways o f estimating DSGE models have been put forward recently. Altig 
et al. (2005) extend tlie methodology of CEE, using several shocks instead of relying on the 
monetary policy shock only. Full-information techniques have also been suggested. Ireland (2004). 
for instance, uses classical maximum likelihood methods to estimate a New Keynesian model, while 
Sinet.s and Wouters (2001) apply Bayesian methods.
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on the nature of monetary transmission, as has also been argued in a recent paper 
by Angeloni et al. (2003). These authors note striking compositional differences in 
the impulse responses for US and EU area data that cannot be fully explained by 
the structural features of prominent DSGE models. However, the models considered 
by Angeloni et al. (2003), i.e. CEE and Smets and Wouters (2003), do not feature 
the sort of financial accelerator effects we are set to study.
Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003), in another related paper, account for 
financial frictions in analyzing the origins of the Great Depression. Overall, their 
model performs well and replicates several key features o f the historical data. How­
ever, the paper does not isolate the precise contribution o f financial frictions to the 
transmission of a given shock, although the authors emphasize that this would pro­
vide crucial information for future model development. Our own paper attempts to 
provide this additional insight with respect to the transmission of monetary policy 
shocks.
Lastly, our econometric approach aims to extend the work of Rotemberg and 
Woodford and CEE by using a different, more efficient weighting scheme. This 
addresses the criticism by Schorfheide (2003) that previous examples o f minimum 
distance estimation have not sufficiently taken into account dependencies between 
impulse responses across periods and series. Apart from promising more precise 
estimates, our approach also lends itself nicely to comparative model evaluation. 
Specifically, we provide distance metric tests to examine the relative fit of several 
restricted models which are nested in our most general specification.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we introduce 
the details of our model, i.e. the stylized economy for which we compute theoretical 
impulse responses. Section 3 looks at the empirical counterpart, presenting our data, 
our VAR model and the associated impulse responses. Section 4 contains a detailed 
description of our estimation strategy. Our results are provided in section 5, and 
section G concludes. The discussion of less instinctive technicalities as well as all 
tables and figures are relegated to the appendix.
2.2 The Model
The model we consider features a financial accelerator in the framework of a DSGE 
model with monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. The way we model 
the financial accelerator largely follows BGG. However, to their exposition we add 
a few features that allow for richer dynamics of the model in response to a mon­
etary policy shock. The model distinguishes households, entrepreneurs, retailers 
and a central bank, whose monetary policy is characterized by an interest feedback 
rule. Households are infinitely-lived and choose consumption intertemporally and 
intratemporally over differentiated goods provided by retailers. Our specification 
of preferences allows for internal habit formation in consumption as in Amato and 
Laubach (2001). Further, households provide differentiated labor services to entre­
preneurs and set wages in a staggered fashion à la Calvo. Entrepreneurs hire labor
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and combine it with capital to produce wholesale output in a fully competitive envi­
ronment. In order to introduce monopolistic competition in the goods market, the 
model comprises a retail sector. Retailers buy wholesale output from entrepreneurs 
and transform it into differentiated goods which are then sold on to households for 
consumption purposes and to the entrepreneur sector for the production of capital 
goods. Retailers face downward sloping demand functions and also set prices à la 
Cal vo.
Refore we describe the objectives and constraints of all agents in greater detail, 
the role o f the entrepreneur sector should be highlighted. This sector is, in fact, the 
key for the working of the financial accelerator. Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and 
have a finite horizon. Recause entrepreneurs are different from households, the model 
does not collapse into a representative agent framework, so borrowing and lending 
is possible in equilibrium. Financial frictions arise from asymmetric information in 
the relationship between borrowers (i.e. entrepreneurs) and lenders (i.e. a financial 
intermediary who ultimately represents households and thus need not be modeled 
explicitly). Specifically, lenders are assumed to face positive costs in the case they 
decide to audit a debtor's economic performance. To minimize resources lost in 
monitoring, lenders will only do this when the borrower declares himself unable to 
honor his contractual obligations, i.e. in a situation o f (supposed) financial distress. 
Hence, auditing costs in the model should be interpreted as proxying for all kinds of 
expenses associated with debtor bankruptcy, such as accounting and legal expenses 
or losses arising from asset liquidation. These costs cause loans to be trailed at a 
premium over the risk-free rate and give an important role to borrowers’ balance 
sheet conditions. In particular, if entrepreneurial wealth is small with respect to the. 
total amount of financing required, bankruptcy is more likely and expected default 
costs rise. As a consequence, borrowers must pay a relatively high premium in 
equilibrium to compensate lenders. This mechanism has interesting implications for 
the propagation of shocks anti the cyclicality of investment, spending and output. 
Specifically, to the extent that a recession depresses entrepreneurial net worth, say 
by causing a decline in asset prices, it automatically triggers a rise in the external 
finance premium, too. The countercyclical behavior o f the finance premium tends to 
amplify swings in borrowing and lead to deeper fluctuations of real activity. Likewise, 
monetary policy shocks have more pronounced effects in that interest rate hikes, 
which already create more precarious business conditions, simultaneously raise the 
risk premium. One of the goals o f our paper is to rigorously assess the quantitative 
importance of this mechanism. To do so. we now turn to a more formal presentation.
2.2.1 Aggregation of Final Goods
Final goods Y) - used for consumption and investment - are bundles o f differenti­
ated goods Yf(-s)- z € [0, 1], which are provided by a continuum of monopolistically
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«»n ij unitive retailors. The usual Dixit-Sti«;litz aggregator reads as
Yt = dz (2 .1)
The optimal allocation of expenditure* across differentiated goods implies a down­
ward sloping <lemand function for a generic good z.
Yt(z) ( 2 .2 )
where Pt(z) denotes the price of good V/(~) and c measures the price elasticity of 
demand among differentiate! goods. I) denotes the juice index of final goods given
^y i
:2.»)
2.2.2 Retailors
Retailers juirchasn wholesale output from entrepreneurs and transform it into dif­
ferentiated goods using a linear technology. This has two implications. First. uj> to 
a first-order aj>proxiination. the amount of final goods varies one-for-one with the 
amount of wholesale goods in the economy. Second, nominal marginal costs in the 
retail sec tor are equal to the juice of wholesale outjnit, Ptu>,
Retailers set prices to maximize ju'ofits, but their ability to do so is constrained 
exogenously. Specifically, in a discrete* time version of ('alvo (1983). we assume 
that each retailor can reoptimize his price in a given jjeriod with j>robability 1 — 0p, 
independently of other firms and of the time elapstxl since the last adjustment. 'Hie 
law of large* numbers implies that a fraction 1 — 0p of retailers reojitimize their 
price's each jjeriod. During the intervals between reoptimizations, inelividiml prices 
an* j>artially inelexed to laggeel inflation, where h-p governs the degree of indexation. 
Conseguenti}', if the price for good z has not been reoptimized for k jieriods, it is 
given by /  / f a ( C ) =  / / ( - ) (ƒ *  4 \jPt- 1 )*''■ Indexation rule's o f this type have been 
suggest eel as a simple way to account for inertia in the observed inflation response 
to a monetary shock. I11 line with Iiotemberg and Wooelford {1997} and BOG, we 
also assume that ju'ice setting occurs prior to the* realization o f any aggregate time t 
disturbance*. Therefore, if reoptimization is possible, a generic retailer ;  will set Pt* 
in order to maximize
/ - i £
À-0
o;±t.k
m P t+ k -i/ P t- i )K' - r tu; k
t+k
V/./4a(^) ( 2. 1)
subject to the demand function (2.2). W ( c )  denotes the sales of retailer  ^ in j>e- 
riod t +  k. if the most recently oj>timized ju ice came into effect in period f. Note that 
future profits are discounted at rate 0* A ^ . where A/.* stands for the intertemjioral
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marginal rate of substitution o f households, who own the retail firms. The factor 0 * 
gives the probability that prices will not be reoptimized for A: periods. The solution 
to the above maximization problem satisfies the first-order condition
£ i - i  { X N * A '* y ''+ *< -)
.A-0
p ; ( r , ¥k-i/ P t-iY
Ptr k c - l
‘t-nt }=  o. (2.5)
where A'/ =  P /’/ ƒ / denotes the relative price of wholesale output in terms of final 
output, our numeraire. A’f thus provides a measure for the real marginal costs 
facing retailers. If all retailers are able to reoptimize prices each period, i.e. if 
Op =  0, prices are set to maintain a constant markup over expected nominal marginal 
costs: the optimality condition (2.5) simplifies to })* =  \cf (e — 1)] Et _ i ƒ>/'’ . The 
size of the markup naturally depends on c, the price elasticity of demand among 
differentiated goods. If instead 0 < 0p < 1, log-linear approximations* of (2.5) and 
the aggregate price index (2.3) imply the following relationship between inflation, 
defined as 7T/ =  log(Pz/P k- j), and real marginal costs x t :
ht~i ( Kp'i’i - i )  — i (ttz + i 4" XpTf- \Xt, (2.6)
where Xp =  (1 — 0p)(l — 30p) J()p and ¡3 denotes the households’ discount factor. 
Note that (2.6) is a variant of the so-called New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Ab­
stracting from the issue of indexation, inflation can be seen to respond both to 
expected future inflation and to pressures stemming from current marginal cost.
2.2.3 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneur sector, in which the financial accelerator originates, is modeled 
largely as in 11GC. Entrepreneurs hire labor and combine it with purchased capital to 
produce wholesale output. In contrast to retailers, they operate in a fully competitive 
environment. Entrepreneurs have a finite horizon, and a fraction 1 — t exits business 
in each period. This assumption is meant to capture the phenomenon of ongoing 
births and deaths of firms. At the same time, it guarantees that entrepreneurs 
remain dependent oil external funds. When they exit business, entrepreneurs’ equity 
is transferred to households.1
*In the following, we rely on log-linear approximations around a non-stochastic steady state. 
Small letters are used to denote the log deviation o f a variable from its sleady-state value, e.g. 
xt -- log {Xt/ X ) .  Note that variables without time subscripts refer to steady-state values.
3This assumption mimics the setup in Christiano. Motto and Kostagno (2003) and avoids in­
troducing a distinct category of entrepreneurs* consumption as in I3GG. Consequently, our model 
has the desirable property that consumption is solely governed by the intertemporal optimization 
o f households and does not include a separate consumption term which would arise as an artifact 
o f the heterogeneous agents setup. In order to ensure a well-defined objective function for entrepre­
neurs. it suffices to assume that they retain a small but practically negligible fraction of net worth 
for their own purposes as they retire.
2.2. TUE MODEL 33
Production
Wholesale goods are produced according to the technology Y ™  =  K *  Ilf* ( / / f  )1-ii~n , 
where Kt denotes the aggregate capital stock, ƒƒ/ denotes aggregated laljor services 
and Hf denotes entrepreneurial labor services (which are assumed to be constant 
and normalized to one). As in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), aggregated la­
bor services are a composite of differentiated labor services provided by individual 
households. The problem of the household as a monopolistic supplier of differenti­
ated labor services is discussed below. A log-linear approximation of the production 
function is given by
yt =  akt +  Wit. (2.7)
Entrepreneurs’ demand for aggregate household labor services is obtained from 
equating the real marginal product o f labor and the real wage, U7r. In log-linear 
terms, this condition reads as
yt -  ht + X t = (2.8 )
Investment dynamics
At the end of period t , entrepreneurs purchase capital that is used for production 
in t +  1. The demand for capital is affected by two types o f frictions, namely 
capital adjustment costs and agency problems in the credit market. Regarding 
the former, we assume that the aggregate capital stock evolves according to Kf+\ =  
$  (It/Kt) Kt +  (1 —S)Kt, where It represents aggregate investment and S denotes the 
depreciation rate. 4> (•) is an increasing and concave function capturing the presence 
o f adjustment costs in the production of capital goods. We restrict this function 
so that the price of capital goods is unity in the steady state, i.e. 4>* (I/K ) =  1 . 
Moreover, $  {I/ K ) — Ó in the steady state, so a log-linear approximation to the law 
of motion for capital reads as
kf+l — Sit +  (1 — ¿)A’f. (2-9)
Conceptually, it is convenient to think of investment as being carried out in a distinct 
and perfectly competitive capital-producing sector owned by entrepreneurs. Here, 
final goods, If. are combined with existing capital, A't, and transformed into new 
capital, A'f+i, under the technological constraints given by the function <I> (•). The 
new capital is then sold to entrepreneurs at the price (in terms o f  the numeraire good) 
Qt. We assume that investment takes time to plan, so investment expenditure is set 
two periods in advance. Such a time span between planning and realizing investment 
expenditure seems highly plausible and is suggested, inter alia, by Christiano and 
Todd (1996). As a consequence, while the asset price Qt adjusts immediately in 
response to shocks, the investment response is delayed. The first-order condition 
that determines the investment decision of capital producers is given by E t-2 Qt =  
Et- 2 [4>/ (It/Kt)]~ *. A log-linear approximation of this condition reads as
E t-tft — vE t-2  (*t — kt) » (2.10)
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where ^ =  (—1<!>"/<I>') ( I/I\) measures the elasticity o f the price of capital witli re­
spect to the investment-capital ratio. As emphasized in BGG, it is through the 
introduction of adjustment costs that volatile asset prices contribute to the fluc­
tuations of entrepreneurial wealth. In addition, adjustment costs smooth out the 
investment response to a given shock. In the steady state, producing new capital 
does not yield any profits, because capital production exhibits constant returns to 
scale. Outside the steady state, however, profits from capital production may dif­
fer from zero, because the existing capital stock is predetermined and cannot be 
adjusted freely. Specifically, real profits are given by =  Q t $ { h f  K t) Kt ~ A-4 
These profits are added to the wealth of entrepreneurs.
Financial frictions
Entrepreneurial activity is exposed to an idiosyncratic shock, ujf > 0, which has a 
mean of one and affects multiplicatively the total payoff from the individual entrepre­
neurs business. Specifically, the total payoff in period t consists of w* times the sum 
of production revenues accruing to capital and the market value of the remaining ca]>- 
ital stock. In the aggregate, because Eu>t — 1, this amounts to aA^Vf +  (l — S)QtKf.
Capital demand is determined by the expected marginal return to capital. The 
realized marginal return to capital is given by
Rf = (aY,Xl/K, + [ l - S ) Q t)/Ql. 1, (2.11)
which implies, in log deviations,
k F A '  , , 1 - S
n  ~ a in & ^ y t + X i ~ kt* +  ~ w r< ii~ qt i ' t2-1*-)
To the extent that capital purchases at the end of period t, Q tK f+p exceed en­
trepreneurial net worth, Ar/+p entrepreneurs depend on external finance, which is 
provided by a financial intermediary. This intermediary earns zero profits in equi­
librium and can perfectly diversify the idiosyncratic risk associated with individual 
entrepreneurial projects. Opportunity costs are, therefore, given by the riskless 
interest rate, Iit+ p paid on real deposits with the intermediary from t to f +  1.
However, the relationship between borrowers and lenders is affected by asym­
metric: information with respect to the above-mentioned shock In particular, 
the intermediary does not observe realizations of u>t costlessly but faces monitoring 
costs equal to a fraction ft. of the entrepreneur’s total payoff if he wants to loam 
about vJf. This assumption introduces costs of default into the model and drives 
a wedge between lenders’ opportunity cost and the cost of credit facing entrepre­
neurs. BGG derive the optimal one-period loan contract that guarantees lenders 
a payoff that is independent of aggregate risk. The contract links repayment to a 
threshold value For any realization of the idiosyncratic shock above this value.
4 The effect o f capital accumulation itself on adjustment costs is o f second order and thus omitted 
here, see BGG,
m itai iüitüitüioi UUU1J
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the borrower pays tlie lender a fixed contractual amount, while for any realization 
below ijf, the borrower defaults on his debt, so the lender audits the borrower and 
seizes all remaining assets net of monitoring costs. In the appendix, we detail the 
derivation of BGG's financial accelerator and show that the optimal contract implies 
an increasing relationship between the entrepreneurs’ capital to net worth ratio and 
the premium on external funds. This relationship is the essential characteristic of 
the financial accelerator, since it relates financing conditions to the current balance 
sheet situation of borrowers. In log-linear terms,
Etrf+i -  n.+i =  -X '(" / + i ~ 9t -  + (2.13)
where \ measures the elasticity of financing conditions with respect to the net worth 
to capital ratio, see equation (AS) in the appendix. Intuitively, the more severe the 
agency problem between borrowers and lenders and, thus, the greater the extent of 
financial frictions in the economy, the higher \ will be. This parameter will therefore 
I day a key role in the discussion below.
Lastly, entrepreneurs’ wealth remains to be properly defined. At the end of 
period t, entrepreneurial net worth, A7+1, consists of the entreprenetirial equity Vt 
held by the fraction 1 of entrepreneurs who stay in business, the share earned by 
entrepreneurial labor in the production of wholesale goods, and profits resulting from 
the production of capital goods, ATf + i =  iVt +  (1 — a — Î2)V/A'* d-II/r^, Entrepreneurial 
equity, in turn, is given by
-  N , ) - , t  r * u I $ Q , - 1K tf{u )'b> ,
JO
i.e. the realized return on capital less repayment of loans. Note that the third term 
on the right-hand side represents the real resources devoted to monitoring entre­
preneurs in default; these expenses are borne by entrepreneurs through financing 
conditions.
Combining the expressions for net worth and equity anti log-linearizing gives the 
following law of motion for net worth:
(Ar/A ') h, + i =  t (ocYX/K +  1 - S - R )  (9f_! +  kt) +  t (cxYX/K +  1 -  S) r f
+ lII{N/K -  l ) n  +  ill {N/K)7it (2.14)
+(1 — q — iî) (Y X / K ) yt +  (1 -  a -  fi) (Y X / K ) x t +  Sqt — il)0 t
with Ot =  log ft f o ‘ v J lfQ t-iK  M  f{*)cL>/DK and D =  /t / 0s w/?*/(w)rfw.
2.2.4 Households
A generic household c € [0.1] provides differentiated labor services, lit (¿)< to the 
entrepreneurial sector. It also decides, in period t — 1, over consumption C{(z) and. 
in principle, the wage rate lCf(s) for the next period. This corresponds to the as­
sumption of a one-period lag in the household's decision-making or, alternatively,
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a conditioning on last period’s information set. In addition, the household is ex­
ogenously constrained in reoptimizing its wage rate in the same way as retailers are 
in reoptimizing prices. However, we assume that households can insure themselves 
against idiosyncratic income risk resulting from the limited ability to set wages opti­
mally in each period, see Woodford (2003). Households are, therefore, homogeneous 
with respect to consumption and deposits held with a financial intermediary, and 
the household's optimization problem can be conveniently analyzed in two stages.
Regarding consumption we adopt the internal habit specification suggested by 
Amato and Laubacli (2001), where the degree o f habit formation is indicated by 
7 € [0, 1].G Specifically, at the first stage household z chooses consumption to 
maximize
E t - ]
*=o
Cm  V ~ g
CM - 1/
1
1 Vh+k(z))
subject to the flow budget constraint
i h t f l ƒƒ,(;) +  RlDt + n „ i( ^ c ,  +  t , + « l+1,
where Bf denotes real deposits held from t — 1 to i, 7* denotes lump-sum taxes and 
IIjjj represents lump-sum transfers. The latter comprise profits earned by retailers 
and the equity of entrepreneurs who exit business. Household optimization requires 
that the flow budget constraint holds with equality and that the household’s wealth 
accumulation satisfies the transversality condition. Let At denote the household’s 
marginal utility o f income at date t. An approximation of the relevant first-order 
conditions is then given by
- 0 E t-\ { ct “ 7(1- 3 y  [(1 -  tr) c,+1 -  (1 + 7(1 -  <r))c,] }
Et (Af+i +  i )
= (1 -  /Ì7)E/_iA/,(2.15)
=  Af. (2.16)
Equation (2.15) relates the marginal utility o f income to lagged, current and future 
values o f consumption, reflecting the time inseparability of utility introducixl by 
habit formation. This condition is supplemented by the standard intertemporal 
optimality condition in (2.16).
At the second stage, households decide on wages. The monopolistic power of 
households follows from the assumption that households’ specific labor sendees are 
bundled into aggregate labor services according to
H t
- I
e-i
(2.1:
sOne advantage o f this ratio specification with respect to alternative (difference) specifications 
is that it remains well defined even if current consumption fails to exceed the habit level.
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Given entrepreneurs’ demand for aggregated labor services, ƒƒ/, and an optimal allo­
cation of wage expenditure, household z faces a downward sloping demand function
H ,(z) (2.18)
where £ measures the wage elasticity o f  demand among differentiated labor services. 
Hf denotes the wage index
(z )l~*dz
i -c
(2.19)
Analogously to the case of retailers, a generic household can reoptimize its wage with 
probability 1 —0W only. Likewise, we assume that wages which are not reoptimized in 
a given period are indexed to past inflation. The degree of indexation is governed by 
kw. Consequently, if the wage rate for labor services z has not been reoptimized for k 
periods, it amounts to 11/+* (¿) =  H i (2) (P /+ * -i/P f-i )*“’. If instead reoptimization 
is possible, the household will set Ilf* set in order to maximize
E t - i » 7
Pt+k
l
1 -f- VVh, f+* (s))I+" }
subject to the demand function (2.18). Note that H tj+ ^ z)  stands for the labor 
supply of household z in period t +  k, if the most recently optimized wage came into 
effect in t. Further, the preference parameter u determines the degree of disutility 
resulting from the provision of labor services. In the case o f a Walrasian labor 
market, it would correspond to the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity o f labor 
supply. The solution to the above problem satisfies the first-order condition
E t - 1 (&owf  ƒ/,.,+*(«) =  0.
A log-linear approximation of this first-order condition, together with (2.19), implies 
a dynamic relationship for wage inflation, ir”' =  log(li f/H ’(_ i) , which is isomorphic 
to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve derived above:
Et- 1 W  -  k^ttî- i ) =  13Et- 1 (*?+! -  ««.Tri) +  \wE t-i {v h t -  A, -  u>r), (2.20)
where A1(. =  (1 — ¡30w) ( l —0w)/ (^«-(1 +  • The real wage, is linked to inflation
and wage inflation in the following way:
= U’/_l + fff -  7T/. (2.21)
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2.2.5 Monetary Policy
We assume that monetary policy is characterized by an interest rate feedback rule 
taking the following flexible form:
-non i _  nom , nom , non1 , nom ,ri+l — P\rt ' P2 rt-\ ' r3r/-2 +^4^-3 +
+ ¿)7r,27ri - l  +  +  ¿>*,4?T/-3 (2.22)
where all the coefTicients are taken directly from the (constrained) VAR as in Rotcm- 
berg and Woodford (1997) and Amato and Laubach (2003). The relationship be­
tween the nominal and real interest rates is, of course, defined as
WVT =  m i + ^ { - i + i } -  (2.23)
2.2.G Market Clearing and Equilibrium
T lìe market for final goods clears in every period,
fi*>t
Yf — £ƒ +  ƒƒ. +  Gt +  /t f  uiltfQt-\I\tf (w)
Jo
where Gt. denotes public spending.6 An approximation to (2.21) gives
(2.21)
Vt =  (C /Y ) ct +   ^(K / Y ) it +  (D K /Y ) 0 t. (2.25)
Likewise, financial markets clear so that deposits. Bt+1, meet the demand for in­
vestment finance, QtKt+\ — Nt±\.
For the purposes of our exercise, we study the equilibrium dynamics around a 
non-stochastic steady state. Specifically, given a shock St to the interest feedback 
rule, we consider sequences for the following generic variables:
{ 7Tf, , r f , r)'om, r , , wf , x t,q t< yt. ct , it, ji( , ht., k(, \t \
y. J t=-o
These variables are matched by the following equilibrium conditions: the New Key­
nesian Phillips Curve (2.6), the production function (2.7), the demand for labor 
(2.8), the law of motion for capital (2.9), investment demand (2.10), return to ca]>- 
ital (2.12), premium on external funds (2.13), the evolution of net worth given by 
(2.14), the Euler equations (2.15) and (2.16), the dynamics of wage inflation (2.20), 
and the goods market clearing condition (2.25). In addition, we use the interest rate 
feedback rule (2.22) and the definitions of the real wage (2.21) and the nominal in­
terest rate (2.23) to pin down the equilibrium.' The implied system of expectational 
difference equations is solved numerically using the Generalized Schur Decomposi­
tion as discussed by Klein (2000). The solution of the model can be represented by 
a first-order autoregressive structure, which, in turn, is used to comput e the impulse 
responses to a monetary policy shock.
‘ 'Government spending is included in the model in order to calibrate steady-state ratios. We 
assume that it is constant, i.e. G t — (7, and financed exclusively through lump-sum taxes.
'N ote that the term Ot in equations (2.14) and (2.25) is o f second-order importance and has
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2.3 Empirical Characterization o f Transmission
Having introduced our theoretical model, we now turn to the empirical character­
ization of monetary transmission, i.e. the dynamics of output components, real 
wage, inflation and the interest rate as apparent from the data. Specifically, we use 
a VAR framework to obtain estimates o f the empirical impulse response functions 
associated with a monetary policy shock. In order to ensure that the VAR actually 
captures the empirical equivalent o f the dynamics implied by our theory, the iden­
tifying restrictions we use in our VAR have to be consistent with the model. This 
requires that the timing of dynamic responses in the VAR be no more restrictive 
than in the model. Consequently, monetary jjolicy shocks are identified by assuming 
that inflation, real wage, output anti its components do not respond contemporane­
ously to a shock in monetary policy. This is a standard assumption in the empirical 
literature and can easily be justified from planning and implementation lags such as 
those incorporated into our model. Likewise, we follow standard practice anti allow 
for four lags in the VAR. The structure of the interest rate feedback nde (2.22) is 
imposed in the estimation, since we directly import this rule from the VAR into the 
model.
Another important note concerns the remaining variables we include in our VAR. 
The guiding principle here again is correspondence with the theoretical model, taking 
into account the canon of previous empirical work. Apart from the variables usually 
considered as the minimum specification, i.e. output (t/), inflation (tt) and the federal 
funds rate we also include the real wage {wr) as well as the components o f
output, consumption (c) and investment (/), whose responses we are particularly 
interested in. Since, in the theoretical model, the dynamics of these variables are 
driven by the state variables, notably capital and net worth, it seems appropriate 
to proxy for these variables in the empirical model, as well. We therefore include 
the inverse of the interest coverage ratio as a proxy variable that captures changes 
in the financial situation of corporate borrowers. The variable, which we also dub 
"corporate interest burden" (cffr) is defined as the ratio of net corporate interest 
expenditure to pre-tax profits plus interest expenditure. It has been suggested by 
previous authors in the literature on financial frictions, e.g. Bcrnanke and Gertlcr 
(1993), as a good real-time measure o f financial strain in the corporate sector, thus 
proxying directly for the net-worth channel we would like to examine. Realistically, 
we allow’ this variable to respond contemporaneously to changes in nominal interest 
rates.8
no perceptible impact on the dynamic behavior o f the economy. The reason already pointed out 
by BGG is that, in the log-linearized equations, this term is weighted by the steady-state level of 
monitoring costs relative to the steady-state values o f equity and output, respectively. Even for 
the highest values o f x  that we consider, the weight o f this term does not exceed 0.13 percent in 
the equity equation and 0.5 percent in the output equation. Therefore we ignore the term in the 
numerical simulations below.
sFinding satisfactory proxies for the capital stock is more difficult, which explains the common 
practice o f specifying empirical VARs without capital. The potential pitfalls of this practice have 
recently been highlighted by Chari. Kehoc and McGrattan (2005). In contrast. Altig et al. (2005)
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Our VAR thus comprises the seven variables (the first two pertaining to period 
t. the rest to t +  1 ) contained in
Zt -  (r j+ i \ c/F , , « ’,r+1, 7Tf+1,y*+1, H+ l * Q +i )' 
and takes the following form:
T Z t =  m +  A Z t-i +  èt, (2.26)
where Zt =  (Z{, Z 't_ l , Z't_ 2 < Z'f ^ -j)1, T  is a 28 x 28 identity matrix with a lower 
triangular 7x7 matrix in the upper left comer that contains the coefficients capturing 
the contemporaneous relationships between the variables in Zt. rn is a vector of 
28 constants. The 28 x 28 matrix A contains coefficients in the first seven rows 
only, since the other rows impose identities. As a consequence, only the first seven 
elements o f the vector ¿7 are different from zero, representing structural shocks. 
Moreover, since the first row o f A  contains the coefficients o f the interest rate reaction 
function, which is also used in the theoretical model, we restrict the coefficients on 
all variables except inflation, GDP and lagged interest rates to be zero. Hence, under 
this identification scheme, the first element o f the vector ët may be interpreted as 
a monetary policy shock, Sf. The structure of (2.26) is very similar to the one 
considered by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Amato and Laubach (2003), 
but allows for even more general dynamics following a monetary policy shock. We 
estimate this VAR recursively by OLS.
The data we use are quarterly US data taken from the NIPA of the RFA (real 
GDP, real consumption, real investment, real hourly compensation in nonfarni busi­
ness sector, GDP deflator, corporate profits and net interest payments) anti the 
Board of Governors o f the Federal Reserve System (federal funds rate). The data 
are transformed in the following way: In accordance with the model, y, /, c and wr 
am defined as log deviations from constant steady-state growth. Our measure of 
financial tightness, c/6, is a detrended ratio variable, while inflation 7r is computed 
from log differences o f the GDP deflator. Finally, the federal funds rate, r ,unn, is 
divided by 100 to obtain a measure for the quarterly interest rated1
The sample we consider is 1980:1 through 2003:1, covering essentially the en­
tire Volcker-Greenspan period to date. Because we wish to identify the historical 
monetary rule from the VAR, it is important to estimate it over a sample period in 
which the coefficients o f (2.22) can reasonably be assumed to be constant. According 
to several authors, including Boivin and Giannoni (2003), policy since the Volcker 
disinflation of the early 1980s has indeed displayed a high degree o f stability.
document that for reasonably large VAR specifications, the omission of capital is not very problem­
atic. For the purposes of our own study, we also conducted a small-scale Monte Carlo experiment. 
Our results (available upon request) strongly confirm the conclusion drawn by Altig et al.
'Note that output and the other level series do not need to be divided by four, since they only 
show up as log deviations from steady state, i.e. in percentage terms. In contrast, shocks to the 
interest rate are in terms o f percentage points, Inflation is already measured and expressed at 
quarterly frequency.
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Turning to the results of our VAR estimation, we begin with the characterization 
of monetary policy based on estimates from the first equation. As is well-known, 
the long-run response of the central bank to changes in inflation is an important 
determinant for the stability o f the economy. Our estimates indicate that the FED?s 
policy has satisfied the so-called Taylor Principle in the Volcker-Greenspan period. 
Specifically, the coefficients on inflation add up to 0.4766, while those on the lagged 
interest rate sum to 0.7853, implying a long-run response o f 2.22, greater than 
one. This finding corresponds closely with the results reported in Clarida, Gall and 
Gertler (2000).
Next, we use the estimated VAR to obtain an empirical characterization of the 
transmission of a monetary policy shock £*. The impulse responses of all seven 
variables are depicted in figure 1. Note that impulses are measured in terms of 
percentage deviations (percentage point deviations in the case o f inflation, corpo­
rate interest burden and the interest rate) from the unshocked path, following a 
unit shock in the quarterly federal funds rate. The shaded areas give 90 percent 
confidence bands, computed by bootstrapping based on 10,000 replications.10 1
The responses of our key variables, output, consumption and investment, show 
the familiar pattern, i.e. a roughly lrump-shaped decline with peak responses after 
two to five quarters. All of these responses are significant, although the reaction 
of investment is much larger in percentage terms than the consumption response. 
Furthermore, we observe a slight but protracted decrease in inflation as well as 
a significant fall in the real wage. The interest rate declines for roughly one year 
before it reaches its steady-state level again. Lastly, our "corporate interest burden" 
variable shows a marked increase following the contractionary monetary shock. This 
squares well with the intuition that higher interest rates will lead to tighter financial 
conditions in the corporate sector, even though the relative importance of financial 
frictions for this result cannot be immediately inferred. Overall, our findings are in 
line with the stylized facts reported by, for example, Christiano, Eichonbaum and 
Evans (1999). In the following they will be confronted with the predictions of our 
theoretical model.
2.4 Estimation Strategy
Having characterized our data and model, we are now in a position to match empir­
ical (VAR) and theoretical (DSGE) impulse responses, thereby obtaining estimates 
for the structural parameters o f our model. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) were 
the first to suggest this estimation technique in the context o f DSGE models.11 
Similar approaches have subsequently been applied by Amato and Laubach (2003), 
Boivin and Giannoni (2003), Giannoni and Woodford (2003) and CEE.
10The bootstrap is also used to compute the covariance matrix o f the impulse responses that we 
require for the main estimation exercise, as discussed in the next section.
11 Note the early use o f a similar statistic, merely for specification testing, in Cogley and Nason 
(1994).
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Generally, one important question in minimum distance estimation concerns the 
issue of which moments or auxiliary statistics to match. From an econometric point 
of view, the moments used in estimation should be as informative as possible, in 
the sense o f bearing strong and distinct relationships with each of the structural 
parameters. While it is often difficult to evaluate this property in a stringent way, 
Adda and Cooper (2003) note that the selection of moments may also be guided by 
other criteria. Economic interest, indeed, would suggest considering aspects o f the 
data that are important in their own right, e.g, because they shed light on the merits 
o f an important theory or because they matter most for economic policy. Against 
tlus background, we consider, as the relevant feature to match, the VAR impulse 
responses characterizing monetary transmission in the data. Importantly, in doing 
so we concentrate on the propagation of one particular shock only, i.e. a shock to 
monetary policy, remaining agnostic about the complete specification of the data 
generating process. In our view, this limited-information strategy fits the stylized 
character o f modern macroeconomic models, although it is certainly less ambitious 
(or trustful of the descriptive value of these models) than full-fledged maximum 
likelihood estimation.
Formally, define 4 ^  to be the empirical impulse response function characterizing 
our data set of length T. Note that 4^  is not a raw moment but a transformation 
of the estimates obtained from a VAR which is supposed to capture the empirical 
counterpart of the dynamics described by our log-linearized model. The model itself, 
in turn, assigns to each admissible vector o f structural parameters 0 a theoretical 
impulse response function 4'* =  4* (0). The binding function 4>() must be assumed to 
be injective to ensure identification. Thus we obtain an estimate for the parameter 
vector of interest, 0 , by minimizing the weighted distance between empirical and 
theoretical impulse response functions, i.e. 4*j. and 4^ :
9 =  argmin (4 ^  -  4> (0))' WT (4 ^  -  *  W ) , (2.27)
where HV represents a positive definite weighting matrix, with IF =  plirnW'r also 
being positive definite. Our choice o f IIV is discussed below.
As there is no analytical expression for the relationship between structural pa­
rameters and impulse response functions, we rely on numerical methods to obtain 
a solution for (2.27). Note, in this context, that our estimation exercise does not 
share the problem of many other simulation-based estimation techniques, in which 
repeated simulations have to be made to determine 4,i for a given 9. The reason 
already discussed above is that we focus on the economyfs deterministic response 
to one well-defined shock, abstracting from all other sources of stochastic variation 
present in the data. Likewise, our estimation problem is somewhat different from 
typical applications o f the so-called Method of Simulated Moments (MSM), where 
the equivalent of a theoretically derived moment condition can be computed for each 
of T  (or ■/) observations in the sample. Instead, we basically have no more than one 
observation of the auxiliary statistic of interest, 4'j-. Therefore we establish the sta­
tistical properties of 4 ^  by means of bootstrapping, prior to the actual minimum
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distance estimation.
Define £  as the asymptotic covariance12 o f y/T — ’¡P), and let Avar ( ’^ ^) de­
note our bootstrap estimate for the asymptotic variance of so that Avar =  
£/T\ Then, in order to obtain efficient estimates,13 we can choose U 7* to be the 
optimal weighting matrix Hropi, i.e. the inverse of our estimate of £ :
w «r‘ =  i t Y 1 =  [TXior(4'5-)] . (2.28)
Although several other authors have acknowledged the possibility and promise of us­
ing this weighting matrix, we are not aware of any application. Boivin and Giannoni
(2003), for instance, point at difficulties with their minimization algorithm. Clearly, 
estimating large covariance matrices may pose problems in practice, but throughout 
our exercises we have not encountered any obstacles that would preclude their use. 
One alternative weighting matrix that was chosen by several other authors is a di­
agonal matrix, whose inverse has the same diagonal entries as the inverse of
jj'opi, wj1i]e au off-diagonals are set to zero. In other words, \Vdia9 is a matrix that 
lias, on its diagonal, the reciprocal values of the asymptotic variance of the impulse 
responses. Using this weighting matrix amounts to embracing an optical criterion 
in that the theoretical impulse responses are made to be as close to the empirical 
ones as possible, in terms of point-wise standard deviations. Despite its appeal, 
this is perhaps not the most convincing criterion, insofar as it completely ignores 
the probabilistic relationship between different impulse responses. In particular, as 
Dedola and Neri (2004) remark, a diagonal weighting matrix treats deviations from 
the point estimates as independent, while in fact they show substantial correlation. 
This observation is related to a similar point raised by Sims and Zha (1999), who 
note that the standard one-deviation error bands considered point-wise do ’'not di­
rectly give much information about the forms of deviation from the point estimate 
of the response function that are most likely.” Below, we will report estimates for 
both choices of IIV.
One further choice concerns the length of the series to be considered. We match 
impulse responses for output, consumption, investment, real wage, inflation and the 
interest rate over the first twelve quarters following the impact. These are all six 
series for which there is a clear correspondence between the model and the VAR. 
Moreover, three years appear to be a reasonable period in order to gauge the effects 
o f a one-time nominal shock. Indeed, most economists would agree (and our VAR 
results suggest) that real variables should largely return to their steady-state values 
within that time.14
Invoking the arguments in McFadden and Newey (1994), we will rely on the
12 We follow previous authors in this literature and implicitly rule out cases where the asymptotic 
covariance would be degenerate. For a discussion, see Benkwitz, Ltttkepohl and Neumann (2000).
13 Of course, efficiency here refers to a given choice of an auxiliary statistic to match.
14Still, to check for the robustness of our findings, we also report estimates based on matching, 
respectively, eight and sixteen periods after the impact. See table 2 below.
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following expression for the asymptotic variance of our estimator.
-* d n  ( o . (G 'i r G ) ' 1 ( G 'i r a r G )  (g 'w g ) ' ) , (2.29)
which, in the case of using the optimal weighting matrix, simplifies to
V f ( d - e \  - rf n  (o . (c; 'e  lc )  ‘ ) , (2.30)
where G  =  denotes the Jacobian of the impulse response function generated
from the model. All matrices contained in (2.29) and (2.30) can be estimated con­
sistently. Specifically, estimates o f UT and £  are obtained as by-products of our 
bootstrapping procedure, and G  can be obtained from numerical differentiation. 
Thus, the asymptotic variance o f 0 reads as
allowing us to report asymptotic standard errors for our estimates.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Parametric Setup
We partition the parameters o f our structural model in three groups. The first 
group comprises parameters that can be fixed before the actual estimation exer­
cise, because their values are inferable from first moments o f the data or otherwise 
uncontroversial. Specifically, we set the time discount rate, ¿7, to 0.99, while the 
quarterly capital depreciation rate, <5, is fixed at the usual 2.5 %. The output shares 
of household labor, il, and capital, a, take the standard values of Gi % and 35 %, 
respectively. The remaining 1 %  accrue to entrepreneurs’ labor in our model. The 
elasticity o f substitution among alternative differentiated goods, e, is set to eight. 
This is close to the value reported by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and implies 
a plausible steady-state markup o f approximately 15 percent. Lastly, in terms of 
output components, we fix the share of government spending at 20 %, the long-run 
average in tile data. Note that the remaining steady-state values, i.e. of capital, 
output, net worth and consumption are updated for each parameter configuration, 
to be consistent with the micro structure of the model economy. In fact, these levels 
are functions of the primitives o f the contracting problem that is at the root of the 
financial accelerator. However, these primitives are not separately identified - only 
the "reduced form" elasticity of financing costs with respect to net worth is. and
(2.32)
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it is one of the parameters we are estimating (\). Thus we explicitly make steady- 
state values a function of \, where the exact functional relationship is based on an 
assumed variation of two of the deep parameters, leaving the third one fixed.15
The second group of parameters are those characterizing monetary policy. As 
detailed before, we specify a fairly general interest rate feedback rule, whose coeffi­
cients are estimated as a by-product o f our VAR. These estimates are directly fed 
into our structural model, so as to ensure consistent definitions o f the monetary 
policy rules in the model and the VAR.16
Finally, we are left with the group of parameters we would like to estimate. 
The vector comprises nine coefficients, i.e. (Ap, Kpt A«,, «ui, V5) 7i However, 
we decide to drop the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply, 
from that list to reduce the dimensionality of our estimation exercise and reflecting 
concerns that this parameter is poorly identified.1' In our baseline setup, we consider 
v — 3. This value conforms with the predominant evidence, from microeconomic 
studies, of relatively low labor supply elasticities, see the discussion in Pistaferri 
(2003). Note further that we cannot identify the Calvo parameter 0W individually, 
given that it only appears jointly with the demand elasticity £. Thus, we simply 
report the slope parameter Xw from the wage inflation equation (2.20). From this 
value, consistent combinations of 0W and £ can be computed. For comparability, 
we proceed symmetrically with respect to the slope parameter Xp from the Phillips 
curve equation (2.6); without strategic complementarities in retailers’ production, 
the Calvo parameter 0P can actually be inferred from Xp. Recall next, that kp and kw 
are the indexation parameters from equations (2.6) and (2.20); \  1S the elasticity of 
financing costs with respect to borrowers’ net worth (equation (2.13)); ip denotes the 
elasticity of the price o f capital with respect to the investment-capital ratio (equation 
(2,10)); a is the preference parameter from our power utility function; and, lastly, 7 
represents the habit formation term from equation (?? ). In accordance with theory,
kw and 7 are constrained to be between 0 and 1; Ap, At(, must be positive, a 
greater than one and \  and <p non-negative.
2.5.2 Point Estimates
Table 1 provides the results o f our baseline estimation exercise. We estimate on the 
basis of (2.27), once using efficient weighting, Hropi, and once the simpler diagonal 
weighting matrix, \Udia9, that has been used exclusively in the previous literature. 
Standard errors are in parentheses, except for parameters that were estimated to be 
on a bound. Although confidence intervals are relatively wide for certain parameters,
15See appendix A .3 for a detailed exposition.
16Note that we refrain from treating the Taylor rule coefficients as "generated regressors". Ba­
sically, they are regarded here as given, as would be done in standard calibration or simulation
exercises.
1 ‘ Apart from our own evidence on this point, this is also the finding of several independent studies 
using different estimation methods, e.g. Dedola and Neri (2004). Table 2 below reports robustness 
checks for the case where we set u to 1 (unit elasticity) and 5, respectively. The most noticeable 
effect o f variation in u is on estimates o f Au., as suggested by equation (2.20).
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our estimates generally have sufficient precision to judge the relative importance of 
different model features. Indeed, some parameters are pinned down quite precisely, 
especially using the efficient weighting matrix. Furthermore, all estimates lie in a 
reasonable range.
Consider first the results for the ’efficient weights’ estimation in column 3. Nom­
inal rigidities in price setting appear to be very pronounced, as can be inferred from 
the low coefficient we find for Ap. Even taking standard errors into account, this 
estimate indicates significant sluggishness in prices. The point estimate for Att) is 
considerably larger and less precisely estimated, suggesting weaker, if still impor­
tant, rigidities in wage setting. Remember that low estimates for Xp and Aw, are 
consistent with high values of the Calvo parameters 0p and 0W and/or a high value 
of the demand elasticity £, in effect implying markedly flat Phillips and wage infla­
tion curves.18 Our results thus align with the findings reported by Gian no ni and 
Woodford (2003) and suggest a strong role for nominal rigidities, especially in prices. 
In addition, the optimal parameter vector implies fidl indexation of both labor and 
goods contracts, since both Kp and kw are estimated to be equal to the upper bound 
of one. This again confirms earlier findings by Giannoni and Woodford (2003) as 
well as Boivin and Giannoni (2003). Next, the coefficient associated with capital ad­
justment costs, ip, is estimated to be highly significant at 0.616-1. The point estimate 
implies that a one percent increase in the investment-capital ratio raises the price of 
capital by roughly 0.65 percent, a high but phmsible number. Likewise, our estimate 
of <t falls into the usual range: in the absence of habit formation, a power utility 
coefficient o f 3.64 would imply an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.27. 
Interestingly, habit formation actually appears to be very mild, with 7 estimated 
insignificantly at 0.1206. This is in contrast with results found by Giannoni and 
coauthors and casts doubt on the claim that habit formation is essential to obtain a 
sufficient match between theory and data. Finally, our main parameter of interest, 
is estimated at sizeable 0.0672, implying that a one percent decrease in the net 
worth to capital ratio raises the cost of external finance by almost 7 basis points 
per quarter. While this value is a little higher than the number assumed in BGG’s 
simulations, our estimate is not statistically significant, with a t-statistic o f 1.48. 
Ac cordingly, it is not quite clear yet wliat is the quantitative importance of financial 
frictions for obtaining a good match between our theoretical model and the data.
Column 4 of table 1 reproduces the corresponding results for the estimation using 
the simple diagonal weighting matrix. As mentioned above, the main difference from 
the case o f  efficient weighting is that now estimates are chosen so as to minimize 
the simple sum of point-wise distances between empirical and theoretical impulse 
responses, in terms of standard deviations. While greater weight is. thus, given 1
1 sTo the extent that very strong nominal rigidities seem to be at odds with microeconomic evi­
dence on price setting, our results highlight the importance of finding additional model features that 
reduce the pass-through of prices into marginal costs. Along these lines, for instance, Fichenbaum 
and Fisher (2001) consider firm-specific capital in the retail sector combined with a non-constant 
elasticity o f substitution among differentiated goods. Thus even low macroeconomic estimates of 
Xv can be reconciled with plausible values of 0P.
2.5. RESULTS 47
to more precisely estimated impulse responses, the estimation does not take into 
account any correlation between different points of the impulse response functions. 
Overall, the estimates are relatively close to the ones discussed above, although stan­
dard errors are considerably larger. Nominal rigidities in prices are again estimated 
to be strong, with Ap taking a very low value. The new estimate for \u, is also in the 
same ballpark as the value in column 3. Next, estimates for kp and kw confirm our 
previous findings on the indexation o f  contracts, even though kp is now estimated 
just below its upper bound of one but significantly different from zero. The estimate 
for <p is somewhat lower than before, whereas a and y  are estimated to be slightly 
higher. Lastly, our central parameter o f interest, x , is estimated at 0.0616, very 
close to the previous estimate but far from significant.
Taken together, the results suggest that sensible parameter estimates can be 
obtained from our estimation exercise. Specifically, explaining the impulse responses 
to a monetary policy shock appears to require strong nominal rigidities, especially 
in prices. In addition, we find evidence for (nearly) full indexation of contracts 
and sizeable capital adjustment costs. At the same time, our estimation lends only 
mild support for the presence o f financial accelerator effects. Furthermore, habit 
formation does not seem to have a role to play in bringing our model in line with 
the data.
In some cases, however, standard errors are relatively large. Moreover, the exact 
shape of the criterion function is unknown, suggesting that further tests should be 
conducted to draw firm conclusions about the relevance of all features encompassed 
by our model. Before tackling this issue, we reproduce, in figure 2, the impulse 
responses implied by the structural parameter estimates given in table 1. As can 
be seen from the graph, the empirical impulse responses are tracked quite well by 
the model evaluated at our parameter estimates. Both the magnitude and the per­
sistence of the impulse responses generated by the VAR are replicated, and the 
model-based responses remain consistently within the confidence bands. Not sur­
prisingly, the better graphical fit is obtained by the parameter vector from the last 
column of table 1. This follows immediately from the criterion function and may 
explain in part why other authors using minimum distance methods have tended 
to opt for a diagonal weighting scheme. Note, however, that optical fit is not nec­
essarily the most convincing criterion in that it fails to take into account the full 
probabilistic pattern of impulse responses.
2.5.3 The Impact of Parameter Perturbations
To get some additional insight into the effects of some features o f the model, con­
sider two perturbations from our estimated parameter vector as reported in the last 
column of table 1 . First, in figure 3, we set the value of \  to zero, corresponding to 
the case without financial frictions. All other parameters remain at their estimated 
values for this exercise. In comparison with the baseline picture, the most striking 
changes are visible from the responses of investment and, somewhat less, output 
and the real wage. Given that financial frictions tend to reinforce fluctuations in
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investment, the investment response is now considerably weaker. Without financial 
frictions, investment falls by nearly half o f the decline observed previously in figure 
2. At the same time, consumption shows only a mild change in the opposite direc­
tion. highlighting the interest o f looking at individual output components. Indeed, 
if consumption and investment were not taken into account individually, the para­
meter configuration underlying figure 3 would look very sound, given the good fit 
with the empirical output series. However, empirical investment differs substantially 
from the t lira ret ical impulse responses. The incremental information provided by 
the component series can thus be very valuable in judging features o f the model 
which, like the financial accelerator, imply distinct compositional effects.
Another variation from our estimated values is analyzed in figure 4. There, we 
set the habit parameter 7 to its upper-bound value of one. As suggested by the 
notion o f habit formation, consumption now drops much less in response to the 
initial shock but smooths out the adjustment in a protracted decline. Other series 
are not affected very much.
Similar perturbation exercises can be made for all other features of the model. 
Our general impression is that the impulse responses are quite informative about 
the parameters we seek to estimate, since even small changes tend to have clear 
effects on the shape of different impulse response series. For instance, variation in 
the slope parameter Xp lias a considerable impact on all impulse responses, especially 
inflation and the real wage. Similarly, Xw and the indexation parameter np have a 
clear bearing on the shape and magnitude of the inflation and real wage responses, 
whereas the effects of varying K.p are more limited. Investment, in turn, is strongly 
affected by if: the higher this parameter, the lower and more protracted the fall 
in investment. Likewise, higher values of <r naturally dampen the consumption 
response. Clearly these findings are good news for our empirical endeavor to identify 
the parameters o f the model. They also suggest that, if the estimates in table 1 are 
sometimes not very precise, this is not because the model’s parameters do not affect 
the economy’s response to a monetary shock. Rather, the likely reason is that 
the model is fairly flexible and thus provides at least a decent fit with the data 
for a range of different parameter configurations. Whether or not at least some 
features o f the model are indispensable for its empirical success will be addressed in 
the next section. First, it should be pointed out that the results obtained for our 
baseline estimation are nicely confirmed by a number of robustness checks reported 
in table 2. We consider the case where estimation, always using efficient weights, 
is based on matching shorter (eight quarters) and longer (sixteen quarters) series o f 
impulse responses than in our baseline case (twelve quarters). In addition, we report 
estimates for different values of the preset labor supply parameter v.
2.5.4 Distance Metric Tests
The central question we wish to address in this paper refers to the quantitative 
importance o f various model ingredients. In fact, our model nests a number o f in­
teresting special cases, such as strong habit formation or the absence o f financial
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frictions. In order to judge the severity o f these and other restrictions, a first infor­
mative statistic is provided by the standard errors in tables 1 and 2, However, given 
the unknown, possibly irregular shape of the criterion function, we prefer to rely on 
additional evidence. We therefore propose to use a distance metric test of specific 
model restrictions as presented in Wooldridge (2002, ch. 14.6). In spirit the test 
is very close to a likelihood-ratio test. Specifically, we compute the loss functions 
(using efficient weighting, which is now essential for the validity of the approach) for 
restricted models in which one parameter is pre-fixed at a given value of interest and 
all other parameters are estimated. Intuitively, if the loss functions differ greatly 
between the restricted and the unrestricted model, we can reject the null that the 
parameter takes on the assumed value. The test statistic in our case looks as follows:
(L* — T* ) x 2 ( #  restrictions)
and is asymptotically distributed as Chi-squared with degrees o f freedom equal to 
the number o f restrictions imposed. L* denotes the value of the loss function at its 
optimum, i.e.
L* = min jF’ t'l'f- — "P (0))' E-1 (>Pf. — 4» (0))
= rain (if. -  i  (0))' (A wTt (if-)) (if- -  i  (0)),
and indices r and u stand for the restricted and unrestricted minimization problem, 
respectively.
To begin with, we revisit the finding that the habit parameter, 7 , was consistently 
estimated to be close to its lower bound o f zero, suggesting a minor role for habit 
formation. We reestimate our structural parameter vector, now forcing 7 to zero. 
The results o f this restricted estimation exercise are provided in table 3, along with 
several further cases. Although the optimum loss function value is slightly higher 
than in the unrestricted case, the difference is clearly too small to reject the null 
hypothesis. Note that this conclusion aligns well with the evidence already provided 
by the standard errors in tables 1 and 2,
Considering, next, the restriction of 7 =  1, we observe a markedly different re­
sult. Imposing strong habit formation causes the model a substantial loss of fit with 
respect to the unrestricted model. Accordingly, we can reject this null hypothesis at 
any conventional level (p-value 0.0003). The main reason for the descriptive inapti­
tude of the restricted model appears to be the distinct impact o f habit formation on 
the consumption response that was already visible from figure 4. Even when other 
parameters are allowed to adjust, the dampening of the initial consumption response 
goes counter to what the VAR impulse responses show'. It w’ould thus seem that 
our model admits a moderate extent of internal habit formation at most in order to 
match the empirical evidence.
Apart from preference parameters, other hypotheses o f obvious interest concern 
the real frictions embedded in the most general model. Thus, we next examine the 
loss in descriptive quality of our model when capital adjustment costs are assumed to
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be absent. As the results in column 4 indicate, this restriction is forcefully rejected 
by the data. Indeed, the minimum loss deteriorates substantially - to more than six 
times the loss of the best unrestricted model. At the same time, the remaining para­
meter estimates take quite extreme values. Real frictions in the investment process 
thus appear to be critical for the descriptive success o f the model, notably to gener­
ate the protracted decrease in investment. While this result is not very surprising, 
a less predictable observation can be made regarding the specific type of financial 
frictions we have embedded into our model. Given the inconclusive evidence regard­
ing the quantitative importance o f financial frictions from our previous estimates, 
we formally test the restriction o f no financial accelerator effects. More precisely, 
in our last experiment we set \  to zero and re-estimate all other parameters o f the 
model. The results in column 5 indicate that this restriction cannot be formally 
rejected. Although financial frictions improve the model’s fit with the data, they 
do not do so strongly enough to produce significant support for x  >  In terms of 
point estimates, the main consequence of fixing x  at zcro is a decrease in the capital 
adjustment parameter, along with a further decrease in Ap and a higher estimate 
of (7. As it turns out, the absence o f financial frictions can be comfortably offset by 
somewhat weaker capital adjustment costs, while the opposite is not true. In tins 
sense, the quantitative importance of financial frictions is relatively limited.
A nice feature throughout is that our distance metric tests fully confirm the 
results from simpler Whld-type tests based on point estimates and the associated 
standard errors. In small samples, this equivalence need not necessarily hold, so we 
have reason to feel all the more reassured about our conclusions as to the relative 
importance of the different model components wre have studied.
2.6 Conclusion
One of the ongoing challenges in the macroeconomic literature, according to Wood­
ford (2003), is to develop a ” fully realistic quantitative model o f the monetary trans­
mission mechanism” . W7e try to contribute to this research agenda by evaluating the 
relative importance of different features encompassed by a candidate model. The 
idea is to find out which aspects o f  the real and the nominal side of a New Keynesian 
model are crucial to account for the stylized facts of monetary transmission, as sum­
marized by a typical set o f empirical impulse response functions. In particular, we 
wish to evaluate the importance o f financial frictions. To this purpose, we propose a 
model which embeds Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist’s (1999) financial accelerator 
into a medium-scale DSGE framework. In order to obtain estimates for the struc­
tural parameters o f our model, we use a minimum distance strategy that matches 
the impulse responses implied by the model with those estimated from US data for 
the Volcker-Greenspan period. Particular emphasis is given to explaining not only 
the response o f aggregate output but also the individual behavior of consumption 
and investment. Moreover, we explicitly take correlation between different impulse 
responses into account by using an efficient weighting scheme in our minimization.
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This procedure also lends itself nicely to an insightful evaluation, through distance 
metric tests, o f individual features that are nested in the most general model.
Our model, evaluated at the parameter estimates, is able to reproduce quite well 
the shape and magnitude of the empirical impulse responses. For this to be the case, 
the model requires strong nominal rigidities in prices and slightly less so in wages. 
There is also evidence for a significant degree of price indexation and against strong 
habit formation in consumption. In addition, our results ascribe an important role to 
capital adjustment costs - apparently an indispensable feature on the real side of our 
New Keynesian model. In contrast, the financial accelerator seems less important 
than we would have conjectured. Although we obtain sizeable point estimates for 
the relevant parameter, they fail to be statistically significant. The same conclusion 
is suggested by our distance metric tests, which show financial frictions to have only 
a marginal impact on improving the model’s fit with the data.
In a sense, this finding may lend support to the widespread use of DSGE models 
that refrain from incorporating financial accelerator effects. An obvious caveat is 
that we focus on the propagation of one shock only, singling out monetary trans­
mission as the relevant benchmark o f empirical success. It is, therefore, conceivable 
that financial frictions have a more crucial role to play as the model is confronted 
with additional aspects of the data. Similarly, one could consider an extended ver­
sion o f the baseline financial accelerator model that allows for heterogeneity across 
sectors. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), for instance, report that small firms contract 
substantially relative to large firms after a monetary tightening, so the assumption 
o f homogeneous responses across firms may be overly restrictive. We think our 
framework is well suited to address these issues in future research.
2.7 Appendix
In this appendix, we sketch the microfoundations of the financial accelerator model 
borrowed from BGG. Its core element is a problem of costly state verification be­
tween borrowers and lenders, giving rise to an external finance premium that is in­
versely related to borrowers’ net worth positions. The following draws on a shorter 
exposition of the problem contained in Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003).
A. Debt Contract
To illustrate the contracting problem between borrowers and lenders, we provide 
an analysis for the steady state, where aggregate risk is absent. Let N  denote 
the steady-state level of net worth, Q the price of capital (equal to one in steady 
state) and I\ the steady-state level o f the capital stock. The entrepreneur borrows 
Q K  — N  to invest K  units of capital in a project. Furthermore, let Rk denote the 
aggregate steady-state return on capital. The return on the project of an individual 
entrepreneur is ioR* , where u) represents a multiplicative lognormal shock with mean 
one, i.e. fn(w) ~  N  (—|cr^7crw)- F°r a given realization o f the idiosyncratic shock 
w, the total payoff on the entrepreneur’s capital is thus wRkQ K . Note that w is
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unknown to both the entrepreneur and the lender prior to the investment decision. 
Even after the realization of the idiosyncratic shock, the lender can only observe w 
by paying a proportionate monitoring cost, ftuRkQ K . Lenders are assumed to be 
(competitive) financial intermediaries who earn zero profits in equilibrium and are 
able to perfectly diversify idiosyncratic credit risk. Accordingly, their opportunity 
cost is R, the riskless interest rate.
Given this setup, the optimal one-period loan contract that leaves lenders with­
out any aggregate credit risk can be shown to specify a threshold value Q for the 
idiosyncratic shock such that if w >  the borrower pays the lender the fixed amount 
ijR kQ K  and keeps the equity (u> — w) RkQI\. Alternatively, if u? <  the borrower 
declares bankruptcy, the lender monitors the borrower and receives (1 — ft) ujRkQI\ 
in residual claims net o f monitoring costs. In equilibrium, loan contracts must satisfy 
the condition that the intermediary earn his opportunity costs, i.c.
f ( l  - / ' ) ƒ * +  } (u )< C j IlkQ K  =  ll(Q K  -  N ). (Al )
The optimal contract maximizes the payoff to the entrepreneur subject to (Al).  
Given constant returns to scale, the threshold value w determines the division o f ex­
pected gross payofT, RkQI\, between borrower and lender. Let F (jj) =  
û) / (jj) cLj denote the gross share of the payoff going to the lender, while fiG(u;) =  
ft Jq w/ {u))du> denotes the expected share pertaining to monitoring costs. The payoff 
share going to the entrepreneur is thus given by 1 — F (îj). Defining k =  QK/N  and 
s =  Rk/R, we can set up the Lagrangian for the problem
L «  (1 -  T  ( ü ) )  ak +  A [ ( r  (w) -  pG (5» )  *k -  (Jfc -  1 ) ] .
The following optimality conditions are obtained:
H   ^ r '(w )-A (r '(« )- /tG'(!D)) = o,
§  : T < ° > - A =  °-
~  : ( V [ ü , ) - , iG(ù>))Sk - { k - l ) = 0 .
where T  (¿>) =  1 — T (¿>) T  A(r (w) — ftG (¿j)). Rearranging gives
a (w) =
A
T(w) (A-)
and
Jb(w) T p )
i -  r ( w ) ’ (A3)
where the Lagrange multiplier, A, is now also defined as a function of ¿j, by virtue of 
the first optimality condition noted above: A(w) =  F'(w) /  (T7 (o>) -  ftG' (¿ ) ) .  BGG 
show that both a'(a>) >  0 and k! (u?) >  0. This ensures the existence of a relationship
k — v (a ) , with t'!/(5) >  0 (A4)
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that links the external finance premium, s , to the ratio between capital and entrepre­
neurial net worth, k. This relationship is the key feature of the financial accelerator.
To determine w, we proceed as follows. The aggregate return on capital in steady 
state, implied by (2.11 ), is given by
R k =  a X Y / K  + (1 -  i ) ,
while steady-state net worth is given by
N = tV + (l-a-Q)XY,
where V =  (1 — F (w)) R kQK. Combining these expressions implies
/*/*(*) =  I (1 -  r (w)) a (O) + 1 - Q ~ n  (a (O) -  /} (1 — 6)), (A5)
a
so that w can be determined for given values of (H, a, /?, ¿,/t, t, ìtJ).
B. Log-linearization
All derivations in the previous subsection pertain to the non-stochastic steady state 
o f the model. However, BGG establish that, with the addition o f aggregate uncer­
tainty, a positive relationship between the external finance premium and the capital 
to net worth ratio continues to hold. Specifically, this relationship can be written as
Q,Kl+i j EtHt+A 
Nt+1 y  &t+1 J (A6)
As in steady-state equation (A4) above, therefore, (AG) provides a link between 
the entrepreneur's demand for physical capital relative to his current net worth and 
the wedge between the expected return to capital, and the safe rate, Rt+i.
Log-linearizing (AG) gives
K/N (q, + *-,+1 -  n<+i) =  t '  ( r f / I l )  R k/R  (& r,*+I -  r/+1)  (A7)
or
Etrf+1 -  rt+1 =  - X  ( « f + i  - q t ~  ¿7+1 ), (A8)
where \  =  Note that while the precise functions V’ and ^  are unknown,
the relevant steady-state values can be readily obtained as follows. Define g as the 
function that relates to s given by (A2) and h as the function that relates to k 
given by (A3). The respective derivatives are as follows:
A 'T  -  A T '
T2
r(i-n + rr
( i - n 2
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Thus we have k =  ip($) =  (s)) and v /(s) =  h '/^ , implying that
v  ( « * / « )  «  _ g ' k  _  X'/X -  T '/T
x ~ v>' ~  h ' s ~  T'/T + r '/ (i -  n  ’
where all functions are evaluated at the threshold value u) determined by (A5).
C. Numerical Implementation
Apart from the parameters a, ¡3<6 and f2, wliich are calibrated from first moments of 
the data and thus taken as given throughout, the microfoundations of the financial 
accelerator were shown to depend on three additional parameters: the variance
of idiosyncratic shocks to the return on capital; p, the percentage rate of bankruptcy 
costs; and t, the entrepreneurs’ natural rate of survival. The combination of these 
parameters determines, in a non-trivial way, the relevant steady-state variables of 
the model and implies a value for \\ the "reduced form" parameter capturing finan­
cial frictions. As we cannot identify and t separately and therefore estimate \
instead, we have to make an assumption as to which values of the former should be 
attributed to a specific value o f the latter. This is important to ensure consistency 
between a given value of y  and the steady-state values imposed during estimation. 
Implicitly, we are thus making the steady state of the model (or, more precisely, 
those steady-state values not already pinned down otherwise) a function o f y , by 
attributing to each possible value of y  a precise combination of deep parameters. 
The range of possible choices is substantially narrowed by three simultaneous con­
siderations. First, the "deep" parameters and i should be realistic in their
own right. In practice, we would thus like to set them close to the values pro­
posed by BGG. Second, variations in the deep parameters should allow y to take 
on any possible value between 0 and, say, 0.1, reflecting every possible situation 
between no and very strong financial frictions. Finally, in any of these situations, 
steady-state values themselves should be realistic, i.e. imply sensible magnitudes 
for default probabilities, monitoring expenditure, the net worth to capital ratio and 
output shares. As a guideline, we consider again the values put forward by BGG, 
e.g. a net worth to capital ratio o f 0.5, which in turn implies a plausible ratio of 
corporate debt to GDP of around one. Requiring all three aspects leaves little other 
possibility than associating changes in y  with simultaneous changes in p and i. In 
particular, variation in only one o f the deep parameters would imply unrealistically 
large deviations from the steady-state values posited by BGG. Thus, we fix at 
0.27, essentially equal to BGG, and associate variations in \  between 0 and nearly 
0.1 with simultaneous, proportionate variation in ft between 0 and 0. 1, and (1 — ¿) 
between 0.012 and 0.03. The latter interval is symmetric about BGG's choice of 
0.021, while the interval for p comprises BGG’s choice o f 0.12 and covers all cases 
between no and very substantial monitoring costs. Thus specified, the steady-state 
risk premium can take values between 0 and 4 % p.a., with a center point o f 2 % 
precisely when financial frictions are close to the level assumed in BGG. Although 
the other crucial stead3-state values do not vary much with y. as desired, we still
ensure in our estimation that they are updated at each step in order to be consistent 
with the microfoundations. In addition, we ascertained that the paper’s main find­
ings are actually not affected by the steady-state adjustment just described. As an 
important example, the insignificance o f the parameter governing financial frictions 
is perfectly robust to the omission o f any steady-state adjustment. Specifically, when 
we repeat the relevant distance metric test reported in table 3, but now maintaining 
all steady-state values implied by the unrestricted point estimate for \ (from table 
1), the test statistic remains minuscule and does not allow to reject the null of no 
financial frictions.
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B Tables and Figures
Table 1: Estimates of structural parameters - baseline model
Parameter Meaning Efficient Weighting Diagonal Weighting
Ap price rigidities 0.0034 0.0032
(low Ap = strong rigidities) (0.0017) (0.0037)
K0 price indexation 1.0000 0.8965
— (0.3171)
Aw wage rigidities 0.0160 0.0249
(low Aw = strong rigidities) (0.0100) (0.0174)
Kw wage indexation 1.0000 1.0000
X financial accelerator 0.0672 0.0616
(0.0453) (0.1390)
9 capital adjustment costs 0.6464 0.5075
(0.1594) (0.5072)
a power utility parameter 3.6382 4.0967
(1.1576) (3.6763)
Y consumption habits 0.1206 0.2659
(0.2897) (0.7877)
toss function • 30.99 16.31
ïTable 2: Robustness checks for baseline specification (efficiënt t
Parameter match 8 quarters match 16 quarters 7 7 7
Ap
K„
0.0031
(0.0022)
1.0000
0.0039
(0.0018)
1.0000
0.0033
(0.0016)
1.0000
v « 5
0 0034 
(0 0017)
1.0000
K
Kw
0.0181
(0.0118)
1.0000
0.0164
(0.0099)
1.0000
0.0425
(0.0201)
1.0000
0 0097 
(0 0058)
1 0000
X
<p
0.0622
(0.0467)
0.6302
(0.1774)
0.0735
(0.0395)
0.6627
(0.1576)
0.0723
(0.0449)
0.6772
(0.1648)
0 0653 
(0 0453)
0 6348 
(0 1578)
CT 3.2413
(1.1218)
3.6928
(1.1694)
3.7168
(1.1790)
3 6092 
(1.1554)
Y 0.1795
(0.2803)
0.1019
(0.2929)
0.1261
(0.2868)
0 1192
(02905)
F
Table 3: Estimates and distance m etric tests fo r restricted models
Parameter
o ii | Y = 1 -6 n o y = 0
K 0.0033
(0.0016)
0.0012
(0.0010)
5.1861
(3.8438)
0.0015
(0.0007)
Ko 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Aw 0.0158
(0.0100)
0.0283
(0.0155)
0.0005
(0.0004)
0.0176
(0.0098)
Kw 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
X 0.0676
(0.0446)
0.0000 0.0000
<P 0.6442
(0.1560)
0.5658
(0.1226)
0.4358
(0.0860)
a 3.6861
(1.1649)
16.0261
(117.4123)
4.6993 
(1.6805)
5.3823
(1.8252)
Y 0.0000 0.0437
(0.3245)
loss function 31.28 43.80 190.05 32.85
test statistic 0.29 12.81 159.06 1.86
p-value 0.5932 0.0003 0.0000 0.1729
Figure 1: Empirical Characterization of Monetary Policy Transmission
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Legend: VAR-based impulse responses to a 
100 basis point increase in the federal funds 
rate (1980:1-2003:4). Shaded areas indicate 
bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals. 
Vertical axes indicate deviations from 
unshocked path.
Inflation, interest rate and corporate interest 
burden: (quarterly) percentage points.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of estimated VAR and DSGE model
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Legend: Impulse responses to a 100 basis point increase in the federal funds rate in VAR and estimated
DSGE model (see legend of figure 1). Responses of estimated DSGE model differ according to the
weighting matrix employed as discussed in the main text.
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Figure 3: The Role of Financial Frictions
a) interest rate b) inflation
Legend: Impulse responses to a 100 basis point increase in the federal funds rate acoording to VAR and
DSGE model. Baseline: model responses computed for parameter estimates obtained on the basis of
diagonal weighting. No financial frictions: % set to zero, other parameters unchanged.
Figure 4: The Role of Habits
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Legend: Impulse responses to a 100 basis point increase in the federal funds rate according to VAR and
DSGE model. Baseline: model responses computed for parameter estimates obtained on the basis of
diagonal weighting. Strong habits: y set to one, other parameters unchanged.
Chapter 3
Asset Market Participation, 
Monetary Policy and the Effects 
of US Government Spending: 
W hat accounts for the Declining 
Fiscal Multiplier? (with Florin 
Bilbiie and André Meier)
3.1 Introduction
One of the most prominent issues in macroeconomics concerns the effects of an in­
crease in government spending. The topic takes center stage in the policy debate 
and lias received great attention in the theoretical literature at least since Keynes’ 
General Th«x>ry. Recently, empirical research dealing with this question has flour­
ished, as well. In u seminal study based on Vector Autoregressions (VAR) for a 
long post-war sample, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) provide evidence indicating a 
positive response of consumption and output to a one-time fiscal shock. Specifically, 
the authors analyze I'S time series data from 1900 to 1997 and report a spending 
multiplier for consumption between one third and one. Similar findings were also 
obtained by Fatihs and Mihov (2001) and Gall. Ldpez-Salido and Valles (2001).
On the theoretical side, although standard business cycle models have difficulty 
explaining this evidence, several recent papers have presented models that can ac­
count for the ’crowding-in’ of consumption, along with a positive response of the 
real wage and the positive co-movement of consumption and hours found in the 
data. One important assumption driving their results pertains to the presence of 
some so-called ’rule-of-thumb’ consumers who, rather than optimizing intertempo- 
rally. simply consume their entire disposable income in a given period. For these
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consumers, the expectation of increased future taxes does not counteract the current 
effects o f higher government spending, so their consumption may actually increase 
following a government spending shock. The idea was popularized in a paper by 
Mankiw (2000) and subsequently taken up by Gall, López-Salido and Vallés (200-1) 
and Bilbiie and Straub (2004), thus helping to bring the theory* in line with what 
the data seemed to show.
More recent empirical studies, however, suggest that the transmission o f fiscal 
policy shocks has actually changed around the time of the early 1980s. Indeed, both 
Perotti (2005) and Mihov (2003) provide fresh VAR-based evidence showing a sub­
stantial reduction in the effects o f  spending shocks after 1980. Perotti, for instance, 
considers five OECD countries including the US and finds that the responses of both 
output and consumption have been significantly smaller and less persistent in the 
post-1980 compared to the pre-1980 period.
Why have the expansionary effects of US fiscal policy diminished over time? The 
fact that the aforementioned studies consistently point to a break date around 1980 
suggests several interesting hypotheses. First, it is widely accepted that the conduct 
o f monetary policy differed substantially before and after the 1980s. This change 
may, of course, have affected the transmission o f shocks in the economy quite gen­
erally. A second hypothesis draws on the observation that fiscal policy itself has 
changed. Perotti (2005), for example, reports that a typical shock to government 
spending tends to display much less persistence in the later sample. A third ex­
planation addresses the behavior o f the private sector, by pointing out the possible 
consequences arising from a pronounced increase in asset market participation. In­
deed, there is strong evidence, presented in Mishkin (1991), that households’ asset 
holdings were subject to several restrictions until the late 1970s and that assets typ­
ically held by small savers were not linked to market interest rates. Bilbiie (2004) 
argues that these constraints may have effectively prevented a considerable fraction 
of households from participating in asset markets, thus hampering these households’ 
capacity to smooth their consumption in the desired way. However, due to both mar­
ket deregulation and financial innovation in the early 1980s, many of the legal and 
quantitative restrictions on households’ financial business progressively disappeared: 
’Regulation Q ’, which imposed severe restrictions on the interest paid by commercial 
banks, was phased out; a reduced minimum denomination of Treasury bills made 
these assets available to a larger class o f savers; money market mutual funds started 
prospering; trading costs at the stock exchanges decreased sharply; and shareholding 
became much more widespread - to name but a few of the developments occurring 
around the time. Generally, the introduction and widespread use of new financial 
instruments and the elimination o f ceilings on deposit rates had the clear effect of 
(re-)linking saving decisions to market interest rates. The underlying institutional 
changes may, thus, have reduced the number o f households who previously did not 
use asset markets to smooth their consumption profiles. As a bottom line, changes in 
private-sector finance complement monetary and fiscal policies as candidate causes 
for the observed decline in the effects o f US government spending.
The goal of the present paper is to evaluate the relative promise of these dif­
ferent explanations. A better understanding of how and why fiscal transmission 
changed during the early 1980s would seem valuable also in view o f the more gen­
eral changes in business cycle behavior occurring around that time. In fact, several 
recent studies of US macroeconomic data have highlighted a marked decrease in 
the volatility of economic activity since the mid-1980s. Kim and Nelson (1999) 
and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) were the first to note a significant modera­
tion of output fluctuations, along with an improved forecastability of growth rates, 
from roughly 1984 onwards. Several subsequent papers, including Stock and Watson 
(2003) and Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2004), have attempted to explain the sources 
of this "Great Moderation". Possible explanations include improved policy-making, 
changes in the behavior of the private sector, and a more benign economic environ­
ment in terms of exogenous shocks. Although in this paper we focus on one (fiscal) 
shock only and thus cannot address all candidate causes of the Great Moderation, 
our analysis will also contrast policy changes with changes in private-sector behav­
ior, potentially allowing for interesting insights into the relative importance of these 
two factors.
To shed light on the question of diminishing fiscal-policy effectiveness and to 
evaluate the competing hypotheses we proceed in the following way. We begin by 
adding to the empirical evidence on fiscal transmission provided by Perotti (2005) 
and Mihov (2003). Specifically, we estimate structural VARs on US time series 
for 1957:1-1979:2 (’SU) and 1983:1-2004:4 (’82’) and document the aforementioned 
reduction in the strength and persistence of fiscal policy effects on output, wages 
and private consumption. Si and S2 constitute appropriate samples for our study, 
because they allow us to characterize fiscal policies before and after any of the 
potentially important changes (to monetary policy, government spending, financial 
markets, and the business cycle quite generally) that were discussed above. In the 
second step, we introduce a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model 
featuring price rigidities, monetary and fiscal policy as well as non-asset holding 
households. Thus, the model nests all three possible explanations for differences 
in fiscal-policy effectiveness across samples. Given that economic interest centrally 
bears on the impulse response functions associated with a government spending 
shock, it is natural to consider this statistic as the critical nexus between theory and 
data. In a third step, we therefore rely on a minimum distance strategy that matches 
impulse responses from the theoretical model with those obtained from the VARs. 
This procedure provides us with well-defined estimates for the parameters of our 
model for both samples and thereby allows us to judge the quantitative importance 
of changes in both household behavior and government policies. Similar estimation 
methods have been employed by several other authors, although mostly in the con­
text of monetary policy analysis. The most prominent examples are Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1997) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). The first appli­
cation to the context of fiscal policy is provided in a paper by Bouakez and Rebei 
(2003).1 Addressing a recent criticism by Chari, Kehoe, McGrattan (2005) and oth­
1 While these authors are also interested in the response of private consumption to a government
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ers, we ensure that the dynamics of our theoretical model are fully nested in the 
VAR, so that the typical problem o f omitted state variables does not arise.
For the purposes of our comparative exercise, we estimate the model for both 
samples and allow policy parameters and the extent o f asset market participation 
to vary, while all deep parameters (governing preferences and technology) are as­
sumed to remain unchanged across periods. Monetary policy is characterized by a 
simple interest rate feedback rule, while fiscal policy is described by two parameters 
governing the persistence of government spending as well as a deficit rule. Overall, 
the parameter estimates o f our model confirm that asset market participation has 
increased considerably after 1980. Our results on monetary policy align with the 
consensus view that the FED has taken a tougher stand on inflation after 1980. 
In addition, the estimates characterizing fiscal policy are also quite different across 
samples, implying that government spending shocks have become less persistent and 
more deficit-financed in S2. To assess the individual impact of these changes on the 
transmission of fiscal shocks, we run counterfactual experiments. Keeping all deep 
parameters constant, we investigate which of the changes between the two samples 
may have been pivotal for the diminishing fiscal multiplier.
We find that increased asset market participation and changes in fiscal policy 
parameters account for some o f the decline in the effects of government spending; 
importantly, they seem crucial in explaining changes in the intertemporal path of the 
responses, and in particular in their persistence. Changes in monetary policy appear 
to be the key factor in explaining the change in absolute magnitude o f the effects at 
any given point in time, but do not seem to explain the change in the shape o f the 
impulse responses.
The rest o f this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we introduce our 
model, i.e. the stylized economy for which we obtain theoretical impulse responses. 
Section 3 looks at the empirical counterpart, presenting our data, our structural 
VAR and the associated empirical impulse responses. Our estimation strategy is 
detailed in section 4, which is followed by a discussion of the results in section 5. In 
section 6, we present several counterfactual experiments that shed some light on the 
importance o f different explanations for our findings. Finally, section 7 summarizes 
the paper and provides a conclusion.
3.2 The Model
The model, which draws on both Galf, L6pez-Salido and Vallès (2004) and Bilbiie 
and Straub (2004), is a standard cashless DSGE model with sticky prices that, in 
addition, features limited asset market participation.* 2 Apart from a continuum of
spending shock, their analysis is based on a model featuring strong Edgeworth complementarity 
between private and public spending. Relying essentially on preferences to explain the crowding-in 
o f consumption, this framework strikes us as less suitable for addressing changes in the transmission 
o f fiscal policy over time.
2Appendix C shows that the explicit introduction o f money into our model would, under res- 
onable assumptions, not affect our theoretical results on the importance of limited asset market
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households, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers which 
set prices on a staggered basis. Moreover, the model specifies two policy-makers. A 
monetary authority sets its policy instrument, the nominal interest rate. A fiscal 
policy authority purchases the consumption good, raises lump-sum and income taxes 
and issues nominal debt.
3.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households [0, l] consuming the final good. We assume 
that a fraction 1 — A o f households smooth consumption by participating in asset 
markets - these households are 'asset holders'. Specifically;*'they trade a riskless 
one-period bond and hold shares in firms. The rest of the households on the [0, A] 
interval do not participate in asset markets - we dub them 'non-asset holders'. This 
distinction between households is assumed to arise not from preferences but from 
their actual capacity (or lack thereof) to participate in asset markets, as in Bilbiie
(2004).* 3 The most important reasons for limited asset market participation appear 
to be concrete institutional constraints like the ones described in Mishkin (1991). 
While we do not take a stand as to what are the deep reasons underlying such 
institutional constraints, we view this feature as a plausible aspect of reality and 
try to assess its empirical relevance in explaining the effects of government spending 
shocks.
Asset holders
Each asset holder on the [A, 1] interval chooses consumption C ^ t, leisure and 
nominal bond holdings B a>h l by solving the following intertemporal problem:
max
3=0 1 —  <7
1 -< T
(3.1)
subject to the budget constraint
1 +  PtCAJt +  m  =  B aj  +  (1 -  r) {\VtNAj  +  PtDA.t) , (3.2)
where /? Ç (0, 1) denotes the discount factor. Rt is the gross nominal return on bonds 
purchased in period t , Pt denotes the price level, U* the nominal wage, and D aj 
represents real dividend payments to households who own shares in the monopolis­
tically competitive firms. NA.t are hours worked by the asset holder; they are given 
by Naj =  1 — La ,t, where time endowment has been normalized to  one. We further 
assume that the income tax rate r  is constant, and that real lump-sum taxes 7) are 
adjusted according to a rule specified below. Note that the utility function in (3.1)
participation in explaining the effects of government spending shocks.
3This assumption is also made in the ‘liquidity effect* literature - see e.g. Alvarez, Lucas and 
Weber (2002). The terminology follows Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). In contrast, Gali et al. and 
Mankiw (2000) distinguish households by their ability to hold physical capital.
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is non-separable in consumption and leisure and belongs to the King-Plosser-Rebelo 
class, being consistent with balanced growth. Maximizing utility (3.1) subject to 
(3.2) implies the first order conditions
* r ] = ¡3Et [Af^+ij, (3.3)
where At,t+a =
(  c AJ y  ( L A j ^ y v - ' ï  p,
\^A ,t+s) \ pA,t )  Pt+s
(3-4)
A C^ tand ——-  — 
La ,i
1 -  r  \Vt
<P Pt *
(3.5)
Non-asset holders
Non-asset holders choose consumption Cjv,t and hours Nprj in each period t by 
solving the intratemporal problem
max
1 — <T
subject to the condition that consumption expenditure equal net income,
(3.6)
PtCNtt =  (1 -  t ) WtNN>t -  PtTt. (3.7)
The first order condition associated with (3.6) is given by
CN t =  1 —  T Wt 
Lpj,t Pt
Note that we have assumed preference homogeneity: <p and a are the same for 
both types of households. This is consistent with the view that the only source of 
heterogeneity among households is their access to asset markets, which can be limited 
due to exogenous institutional constraints. We also assume that hours worked in 
steady state are the same for both types o f households, Nt\ =  =  N. Because of
preference homogeneity, this requires that steady-state asset income be zero so that 
consumption shares are equal across groups, C 4 =  C/y =  C. See Appendix A for 
details.
(3.8)
3.2.2 Firms
Final output is produced by a representative competitive firm. This firm purchases 
differentiated intermediate goods i €  [0, 1] from monopolistically competitive pro­
ducers and combines them into the final good. The aggregation technology is o f the 
CES form, with s denoting the constant elasticity o f substitution:
«-GC«»“ *)'" (3.9)
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where Yt (?) denotes the quantity used of differentiated good i at time t. The final- 
goods firm maximizes profits PtYt — / q Pt (?) Yt(i)di, where Pi is the overall price 
index for the final good and Pt (?) denotes the price o f intermediate good i. This 
implies a downward-sloping demand curve for each intermediate input:
Yt(i) =  (P t.(i)IP t)-e Yt, (3.10)
1/ (1-*)
while the price index is given by Pt =  Pt ( i)1 e
The monopolistically competitive producers of intermediate goods face a tech­
nology which is linear in labor and subject to a fixed cost F:
V*(?) =  Nt(i) — F , if iVji(i) >  F, otherwise Vf(i) =  0. (3.11)
The share of the fixed cost F in steady-state output governs the degree of increas­
ing returns to scale. Real profits of a generic firm are thus given by Of (?) =  
[Ff (?) /Pt] Yt ( i) - [U  f/Pf] Nt (?). Following Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996), intermediate- 
good firms are assumed to adjust their prices infrequently. We define a  as the prob­
ability of keeping the price constant in a given period. This exogenous probability 
is independent of past price adjustments. Accordingly, with probability (1 — a ), the 
firm is able to reoptimize and change its price. Given this possibility, a generic firm 
i will set P(?) in order to solve
oo
max Et £  o*Alli+,  [R (»M .t+.(i)  -  II
s=0
subject to the demand function (3.10). Recall from (3.4) above that At.,t+s denotes 
the stochastic discount factor characterizing asset holders, who own the firms. The 
first order condition for this problem is given by
OO * \
Et £  (  P,(i) -  T^j-Il',,» )  =  0
3-0  \ M /
(3.12)
In equilibrium each producer who sets a new price Pf(?) in period t will choose the 
same price and the same level of output.
3.2.3 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is characterized by an interest rate feedback rule whereby the nom­
inal interest rate Rt is a function (.) of expected inflation:
Rt =  4>(FfIlf+i), (3.13)
where Ilf+i =  Pf+i/Pf denotes gross inflation between t and t +  1. The constant 
elasticity of this function, governs the response of interest rates to expected 
inflation.
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3.2.4 Fiscal policy
The fiscal authority purchases consumption goods, G f, raises distort ion ary and lump­
sum taxes and issues debt, B t +1, consisting of one-period nominal discount bonds. 
The government budget constraint reads as
n p B t+1 =  n , + P , [C, -  t Y, -  T, ] . (3.14)
Letting 9t — ‘ ' :,T' , with letters without time subscript denoting steady state values, 
we assume that government spending follows an exogenous AR(2) process.
9t =  P \ 9 t - 1 +  P-29 t - 2  +  £f, ( 3.15)
which allows for a hump shaped response of spending to a spending innovation 
The financing of government spending is determined by a deficit rule. Thus, let 
Dt =  Gt — T( — rYt denote the primary deficit, i.e. total non-interest spending less 
revenues. We also define the structural deficit, Dsj ,  as the primary deficit adjusted 
for automatic responses of tax revenues resulting from deviations of output from its 
steady-state value: Dsj  =  Dt +  r  (VJ— Y) — Gt — TJ. — t Y . To ensure consistency 
with the empirical counterpart of the model (and for ease of comparison with other 
empirical studies), we divide the deficit and debt variables by output Y).1 Letting 
dsj  denote a first order Taylor approximation of I )sj/Yt around the steady state, 
we assume that the structural deficit is adjusted according to the following rule:
(h,t — vds,t-1  +  <}>gGygt +  4 (3.16)
where 6* =  lit/ ( P / - i Y# i )  is real debt divided by last period's output, in order to 
remain a state variable. Rules of this type have been studied extensively, sex' e.g. 
Bolm (1998) and Gali and Perotti (2003). The parameter 7/ captures the possibility 
that budget decisions are autoeorrelated, while the parameter 0g measures the de­
gree of deficit finance of temporary increases in government spending, for ease of 
interpretation, we rescale the coefficient on spending with the steady-state share of 
government spending in output, G y  such that all variables are in output units. Fi­
nally, the parameter 4>b governs the response of the deficit to the bcgiiming-of-pcriod 
ratio of debt to GDP. hence capturing a 'debt stabilization' motive: a negative value 
of o b indicates that deficits are adjusted in order to stabilize outstanding debt.
3.2.5 Equilibrium, market clearing am! aggregation
A rational expectations equilibrium is a sequence of processes for all prices and 
quantities introduced above such that the optimality conditions hold for all agents 
and all markets clear at any given time t. Specifically, market clearing requires that
4 Note that, since we assume that in steady-state debt and deficits are zero, first -order variations 
in any of these variables around tlie steady state are isomorphic to those of variables defined as 
shares of steady state output. For example, if say X ~ 0. up to first order around this steady-state 
we have XtfYt ^  Xt/Y.
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labor demand equal total labor sujjply. \ t =  A +  (1 -  A) ArAjt  all profit income 
be distributecl as tli\'icli’iicls to shareholders (asset holders) and all government debt 
1m1 lield by asset holders, lit)] =  (1 — Ily Walras* law. then, the goods
market also clears: Ct + (,'t =  V}, where aggregate consumption is Ct =  ACjY.f -f 
(1 — A)C\yf. We solve numerically a locally approximate (log-linear) version of the 
model around its non-stochastic steady state, sex1 Appendix B for details.
3.2.G Government spending shocks and consumption
I his subsection describes the1 intuition behind fiscal policy transmission in the 
model outlined above. Ib start with, consider the case in which utility is sepa­
rable (ct —► 1).’* Note*, that an increase1 in government spending will generally depress 
the1 consumption of asset holders because of a negative wealth effect resulting from 
the induced increase in the tax burden (in present value terms). In the case of an 
active monetary policy, i.e. for d>^  > 1, there is an additional substitution effect op­
erating in the same direct ion; this is triggered by an increase in the real interest rate 
as the increase in government spending leads to a rise in inflation. Those channels 
of transmission are1 at the heart of the analysis of fiscal transmission in standard 
business cycle models, e.g, Baxter and King (1993) and Liimemann and Schabert 
(20U3). They generally induce a crowding out of private consumption in response 
to increases in government spending.
In contrast., in the present model it is possible for total private consumption 
to increase, the basic mechanism relying upon a strong enough increase in the real 
wage. In tact, a higher real wage induces an increase in the consumption of non-asset 
holders which may eventually more than offset the fall in the consumption of asset 
holders.
The response o f the real wage naturally depends on the interplay of labor supply 
and demand. To begin with, a government spending shock increases the demand for 
goods. With sticky juices a la Calvo. this has an effect on labor demand; firms who 
cannot change their juice will adjust quantities, hence shifting labor demand at a 
given wage (the rest of the firms will increase their jjrices. creating inflation). This 
effect is larger, the larger the degree of judee stickiness (and is absent with flexible 
ju'ices).
Labor sujqdy shifts for two different reasons. First, there is a direct income 
effect on the labor sujqdy of 11011-asset holders who are willing to work more as the 
tax burden increases. 1 This shift can be avoided on imjuict if sj>ending is deficit- 
financed - the path o f taxation matters for non-asset holders. Second, asset holders 
also increase labor sujiply for a given wage: this is due both to the wealth effect - 
asset holders internalize the government budget constraint - and to intertemj)oral 
substitution. The latter effect occurs if an increase in inflation triggers an increase
5 The resulting model is essentially the same as the lump-sum taxes version o f Bilbiie ami Straub 
(2001). on which the following discussion draws.
 ^In Appendix B we tie tail how the reduced-form labor supply o f non-asset hoi tiers is a function 
o f the real wage and lump sum taxes.
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in the real interest rate, thus providing incentives for asset holders to postpone 
consumption. Consequently, the overall shift in labor supply is smaller, the smaller: 
i) the persistence of the government spending shock: lower persistence reduces the 
present discounted value of taxes and the wealth effect on asset holders; ii) the degree 
of monetary policy activism: a less aggressive monetary policy implies a lower real 
interest rate and thereby weakens asset holders’ incentives to postpone consumption; 
and iii) the degree of deficit financing: deficit financing reduces the wealth effect on 
non-asset holders.
When the shift in labor demand dominates the shift in labor supply (which also 
requires that the latter be sufficiently inelastic), a high enough increase in the real 
wage may obtain so that aggregate consumption increases. Note, however, that 
a strong increase in the real wage does not necessarily lead to a rise in aggregate 
consumption. In fact, such a change also brings about a high increase in marginal 
costs and a fall in profits, so the consumption of asset holders decreases by more. 
Furthermore, while deficit financing works towards ensuring a positive consumption 
response in most cases, this is not a general result. Due to limited asset market 
participation, deficits have a negative effect on asset holders’ consumption above 
and beyond the standard wealtli effect associated with the present discounted value 
of government spending. Specifically, an increase in debt siphons further resources 
away from the potential consumption of asset holders, since they will end up holding 
all debt issued by the government. For asset holders, this amount - in per capita 
terms - exceeds the debt level of the government by a factor o f A/ (1 — A), because 
non-asset holders do not hold any debt.
When utility is non-separable (er ^  1), there is an additional channel changing 
the co-movement between consumption and hours of asset holders. Specifically, if 
<7 > 1, hours and consumption will co-move positively: for a given increase in the 
real wage, asset holders substitute out o f leisure into consumption. In particular, 
the negative wealth effect that induces an increase in hours worked can also induce 
an increase in consumption. Moreover, a  >  1 reduces the elasticity of asset holders’ 
consumption to real interest rate movements, since it implies a lower elasticity o f 
intertemporal substitution. This, in turn, means that asset holders have weaker 
incentives to postpone consumption for a given increase in real interest rates.
All things considered, the discussion makes clear that even a relatively parsimo­
nious specification may generate quite complex interactions between the different 
features o f the model.' In our view, tins further increases the promise of estimating 
the model’s parameters by means of a minimum-distance procedure that ensures the 
greatest possible match between the model’s theoretical predictions and important 
empirical regularities in the data.
"All the etFecits described in this paragraph can be clearly seen from the loglinearized version o f 
the buler equations in Appendix B.
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3.3 Empirical Characterization of Transmission
3.3.1 VAR specification
Having introduced our theoretical model, wc now turn to the empirical characteri­
zation of fiscal transmission, i.e. the effects o f a temporary increase in government 
spending as apparent from the data. Sj>ccifically, we use a VAR framework to obtain 
estimates o f the empirical impulse response functions associated with a government 
spending shock.
As our goal is to estimate the structural parameters of our model by minimizing 
the distance between theoretical and empirical impulse responses, we have to ensure 
that the VAR actually captures the empirical equivalent of the dynamics implied by 
our theory. In other words, the log-linear model ought to be nested in our VAR. This 
has two implications. First, the identifying restrictions we use in our VAR have to 
be consistent with the model. In the VAR literature on fiscal transmission, shocks 
to government spending have been identified on the assumption that government 
spending is not contemjjoraneously affected by the other variables included in the 
V A R .8 We rely on the same identifying assumption, thereby nesting the model, where 
government spending is assumed to follow an exogenous AR(2) process. Moreover, 
like in the model, we allow all variables in the VAR to respond contemporaneously 
to government spending shocks. Specifically, we give a structural interpretation to 
the shocks obtained from a recursive VAR w’liere government spending is ordered 
first, see Stock and Watson (2001). Following Perotti (2005), such a structural shock 
is interpreted as a random discretionary disturbance to government spending. This 
assumption can be justified from the observation that discretionary fiscal policy 
plausibly does not respond within a quarter to a change in the economy as reflected 
by an output innovation. Likewise, automatic stabilization is unlikely to occur within 
one quarter, given that our definition of government spending comprises government 
consumption and government investment but does not include transfer payments.
Second, the solution of the log-linearized model implies a state-space system in 
which all variables are functions of the current state only. The set o f state variables 
in our model comprises current government debt and its lagged value along with the 
lagged value of output9, as well as the current value and first two lags o f government 
spending. It is therefore desirable to include this set o f variables in the VAR.10 
Accordingly, government debt and government spending are the two fiscal variables 
in our VAR. As the real wage response plays an important role in the transmission
8See Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatds and Mihov (2001), Gali, Ldpez-Salido and Valles 
(2004), and Perotti (2005).
9Lagged debt and output appear as state variables since from the government budget constraint 
lagged structural deficit can be expressed as a function of these variables.
10This specification choice implicitly addresses the issue raised in a recent critique of the Structural 
VAR approach bv Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005). They show, using artifical data generated 
b\' an RBC model, that a VAR with four lags but without the state variable capital may be seriously 
misspecified. The fact that we include the relevant states in our VAR resolves this problem and 
ensures that the model dynamics are actually nested in the empirical specification.
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of spending shocks, we also include this variable. Eventually, our VAR model com­
prises five variables: government spending, output, wages, private consumption, and 
government debt. Spending, output and consumption are expressed in logs o f real 
per capita terms, real wages are in logs, and debt is given as share of output. We 
include four lags of each variable together with a constant and remove a linear time 
trend from all variables except the debt ratio.11
As discussed above, earlier studies such as Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and 
Fat^s and Mihov (2001) have reported a substantial increase in private consumption 
in response to a government spending shock.12 However, new evidence by Perotti
(2005) and Mihov (2003) suggests that the transmission of fiscal shocks changed 
substantially in the early 1980s. Most importantly, the response of consumption 
appears to have become considerably weaker. In order to trace these changes in fis­
cal policy, we consider a sample split around the year 1980, taking into account the 
possibility of structural breaks in other economic areas, as well. Specifically, given 
the prominent role of monetary policy in our subsequent analysis, we decide to end 
the first sample in 1979:2, i.e. just before the beginning of the Volcker chairman­
ship; the second sample then starts in 1983:1, i.e. just after the Volcker disinflation 
period. This split also seems appropriate with respect to the evidence on two other 
phenomena that are relevant for our study, namely the financial liberalization oc­
curring in the early 1980s and the changes in business-cycle dynamics dated, again, 
in the early- to mid-1980s. Hence we estimate VARs on US time scries data for the 
two samples: 1957:1-1979:2 (Si) and 1983:1-2004:4 (S2).
3.3.2 Empirical impulse responses
Figure 1 displays the impulse response functions of all five variables to a one percent 
increase in government spending for both SI (left column) and S2 (right column). 
While the solid lines with dots indicate point estimates, the shaded areas represent
11 The data are drawn from several sources. From the National Income and Product Accounts 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis) we obtain real government spending, which is government con­
sumption expenditures and gross investment (A822RX1). Real GDP (A191RX1) and real total 
personal consumption expenditures (A002RX1) are also taken from the N1PA. The real wage is 
obtained from the Bureau of Labour Statistics: Nonfarm business real hourly compensation (BLS: 
PRS8-1006153). Finally, end-of-period debt figures (total U.S. government debt privately held) come 
from the International Financial Statistics o f the IMF (11188...ZF...). Private consumption, output 
and government spending are normalized by the current population level (N1PA: B230HC0).
'"N ote also that alternative identification schemes have generally led to less clear-cut results 
regarding the reponse o f private consumption to a spending shock. Identification o f fiscal shocks 
based on sign restrictions is suggested by Mountford and Uhlig (2004). They find that private 
consumption increases, but not significantly’, in response to a deficit-fin a need government spending 
shock. In the case o f a balanced-budget spending shock, consumption is observed to fall, but again 
not significantly. Yet another identification scheme is employed byr Ramey and Shapiro (1998) 
and Edelberg. Eichenbaum and Fisher (1909), who study the response o f economic time series 
to a dummy variable capturing fiscal episodes (Korean and Vietnam wars and Reagan military 
buildup). Both studies report mixed results regarding different components of private consumption 
expenditure at different horizons. Overall, the reponse o f consumption to a fiscal episode is found 
to be small in this line of work.
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symmetric 90 percent confidence intervals, computed by bootstrapping baseil on 
1000 replications.
In the first row, the response of government spending can be seen to display 
greater persistence in SI compared to S2. Tins is in line with an earlier finding 
reported by Perotti (2005). Output, shown in the next row. features impact (max­
imum) increases of 0.32 (0.10) percent in SI and of 0.20 (0.20) percent in S2. The 
responses are significant in t>oth samples, but only in Si is the increase significant 
for an extended period of about two years. The response of the real wage is reported 
in the third row. Here a significant increase can l>e observed only for the first sam­
ple. Note that this stxuns consistent with the findings reported by other studies that 
cover longer sample periods. Specifically, Gall et al. (2001) also report an increase 
in the real wage on the basis of a VAR on US data from 195-1-1998. The results for 
the period 1900-1990 examined by Fat6s and Mihov (2001). in turn, depend on the 
precise wage measure under study. While most of the measures rise in response to 
a spending shock, only manufacturing wages do so significantly.
The fourth row depicts the response o f consumption. Although the point es­
timates for the first few periods look rather similar, the response is significantly 
positive in SI for about two years, but not so in S2. This accords qualitatively with 
the earlier findings of Mihov (2903) and Perotti (2005) regarding a weaker response 
o f private consumption in S2 relative to SI. However, the most striking difference 
across samples consists in the much greater persistence of the effect in SI.
The last set of panels pertain to the response of government debt (measured 
at the end of the period) relative to GDP. Here the differences across samples are 
most remarkable: in SI the debt ratio falls significantly in response to an increase 
in government spending, whereas in S2 a significant increase in the debt ratio can 
be observed. This finding sex'ms again consistent with Perotti (2005), although he 
dors not consider debt but tax revenues in the VAR. Specifically, Perotti notes that 
the cumulative net tax response to a spending shock is typically* positive in SI and 
negative in S2.I,i
Another way to summarize the evidence is provided by table 1, which reports the 
cumulated impulse responses, for -1, 12 and 20 quarters, for all variables and both 
samples. Most interestingly, the cumulative response of consumption (output) in the 
second sample is only about one third (one half) of the cumulative response in the 
first sample. Similar differences are also visible for government spending itself ami 
even more for the cumulative wage response. The right column of table 1 reports 
the difference in the cumulative responses between both samples. For all variables 
and at almost all horizons, the difference exceeds one to two standard errors.
Overall, our results add corroborating evidence to tlie observations reported by 
Perotti (2005) and Mihov (2003). A comparison of both samples points towards 
a substantial change in the transmission o f spending shocks. In particular, the 
responses of output and consumption are less significant and less persistent in the 13
13 Note III at Perotti also calculates the cu initiative deficit response and finds it positive in both 
samples, although much larger in S2 (2.8 vs. 0.8).
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second sample sample. Government spending itself also shows less persistence in S2. 
Likewise, real wages increase over an extended period in Si but only briefly in S2. 
Finally, the responses of government debt indicate a change in the financing of a 
typical government spending shock: while in SI an increase in government spending 
is associated with a fall in the debt ratio, in S2 the opposite holds, indicating more 
reliance upon deficit financing of spending.
3.4 Estimating the Structural Model
3.4.1 Minimum-distance strategy
The next step of our analysis consists in matching empirical (VAR) and theoretical 
(DSGE) impulse responses in order to obtain estimates for the parameters o f our 
model. Roteniberg and Woodford (1997) were the first to suggest this minimum- 
distance technique in the context o f DSGE models. Similar approaches have subse­
quently been applied by Amato and Laubach (2003), Boivin and Giannoni (2003) 
and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (200o).
Generally, one important question in minimum-distance estimation concerns the 
issue of which moments or auxiliary statistics to match. From an econometric point 
of view, the moments used in estimation should be as informative as possible, in 
the sense o f bearing strong and distinct relationships with each of the structural 
parameters. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to evaluate this property in a stringent 
way. In addition, this is not the only relevant criterion for choosing moments. 
Indeed, from an economic point o f view, the moments should also be important in 
their own right. This means, in particular, that they should represent aspects o f the 
data on which economic interest is centered, e.g. because they are clearly linked with 
important theories or because they matter most for economic, policy. In the case 
of fiscal policy which we consider, a crucial issue is the response of output and its 
components to a shock in government spending. Moreover, since the real wage plays 
a central role in the transmission o f fiscal shocks in our theoretical model (see Section 
2,6), we also match its response.14 ESoth the direction and the size of these responses 
are important benchmarks on which to measure the descriptive quality o f competing 
models. Accordingly, we consider, as the relevant feature to match, the empirical 
impulse response functions that were presented in the previous section. In doing so 
we concentrate on the propagation of one particular shock, whose identification is 
consistent with both otir theoretical model and a number o f prominent contributions 
in the empirical literature. Consequently, this strategy allows us to avoid making 
restrictive assumptions on the nature and interaction of all other possible shocks in 
the economy, as would be required, for example, in maximum likelihood estimation.
[«brmally, define ^  to be the empirical impulse response function characterizing 
the data. Note that it is not a raw moment but a transformation of the estimates
14Note that, in doing so, we implicitly address a potentially important, criticism having to do 
with the cyclicality of real wages - see Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
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obtained from a VAR that nests the log-linearized model. The model itself, in turn, 
assigns to each admissible vector o f structural parameters 0 a theoretical impulse 
response function 4^ =  (0). The binding function must be assumed to be
injective to ensure identification. We obtain an estimate for the parameter vector of 
interest, 0, by minimizing the weighted distance between empirical and theoretical 
impulse response functions, i.e. and
0 =  argmin ( * c -  *  (0) ) '\V { V  -  *  (0)), (3.17)
where IT represents a positive definite weighting matrix.
As the relationship between structural parameters and the implied impulse re­
sponse functions is non-linear, we rely on numerical methods to obtain a solution 
for (3.17). Basically, (0) is evaluated repeatedly for different parameter vectors 0, 
until the closest fit with the empirical impulse responses, ty*, has been obtained.
Our choice of the weighting matrix IT is guided by the idea of giving greater 
weight to impulse responses that are more precisely estimated. Tlius we opt for 
the diagonal matrix U'dwiff whose diagonal entries are the reciprocal values of the 
variance of the empirical impulse responses. Using this weighting matrix ensures 
that the theoretical impulse responses are made to be as close to the empirical ones 
as possible, in terms of point-wise standard deviations. Regarding the length of the 
impulse response series to be considered, we decide to consider the first 20 quarters 
for all five variables.
Standard errors for 0 are computed using the following expression for the asymp­
totic variance of our estimator, taken from Wooldridge (2002):
Avwr (£ )  =  (G'tUG)-1  ( g 'IUSU'g )  (G 'lT G )“ 1 . (3.18)
where G — represents the Jacobian of the impulse response function gener­
ated from the model and E denotes the bootstrap-estimated variance matrix o f the 
impulse responses.
3.4.2 Parametric setup
We partition the parameters of our structural model in three groups. The first group 
comprises parameters that can be fixed before the actual estimation exercise, be­
cause their values are uncontroversial or easily inferred from first moments of the 
data. Specifically, this is true for the time discount rate ¡3 which we set to 1.03“ 1^ 4, 
matching the inverse of the steady-state gross real rate of return at quarterly fre­
quency. Further, we set the share of government expenditure in GDP, Gy, to 0.2 
and the steady-state tax rate, r, to 0.3. Together with the assumption that the 
steady-state share of debt Dpy — 0, these pin down lump-sum transfers in steady 
state. The elasticity o f substitution £ is chosen such that the markup in steady state 
equals 20 percent. Lastly, we also assume that, in steady state, agents spend one 
fourth of their time endowment working.
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The remaining parameters are those that could, in principle, be estimated using 
our minimum-distance strategy. However, given the set of moments we exploit, 
certain parameters are not particularly well identified, so we find it preferable to 
fix them at values that have been established in the previous literature. This also 
helps us to keep the dimension of our optimization problem tractable. Thus we fix 
a. the probability that prices are not changed in a given period, at 0.77 (SI) and
0. 84 (S2), corresponding to the estimates reported by Gall and Gertler (1999), who 
apply single-equation estimation techniques to the New Keynesian Phillips curve15. 
Similarly, we fix a , which measures the inverse o f the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, at a conventional value of two.
The third set of parameters comprises those that we actually seek to estimate. 
These are: the Taylor rule coefficient the parameters governing fiscal policy.
1. e. /}], p2, <$>q. <l>b and 7/, as well as the share of non-asset holders, A. All of these 
parameters are allowed to vary across the two samples. In total, we thus provide 
estimates for 14 parameters.
Finally, we have to take into account that certain parameter configurations could 
imply equilibrium indeterminacy in our theoretical model.10 In this case, we resort 
to the well-known minimal state variable criterion of McCallum (1999) in order to 
select an equilibrium and compute the corresponding impulse response functions.
3.5 Results
Table 2 provides the results of our estimation exercise for both samples. We estimate 
on the basis of (3.17). using the diagonal weighting matrix U -dmg descried  }lbove. 
Standard errors based on (3.18) are reported below the respective point estimates. 
Almost all parameters are estimated with satisfactory precision, although the differ­
ences between estimates for the two samples tend to remain below the usual levels 
of statistical significance. Before discussing the results in greater detail, note also 
that the set of estimates imply a determinate equilibrium for each sample, despite 
the fact that uniqueness was not imposed a priori.
Perhaps the most interesting single parameter, the estimated extent of asset 
market participation differs considerably across periods. Specifically, the share of 
consumers who do not smooth consumption by trading in assets is estimated at 
a significant A — 0.52 in Si and at 0.32 in S2 (note that while the SI value is 
statistically significant, the S2 value is not). This finding is consistent with the notion 
that access to asset markets has widened substantially over the last two decades, 
with potentially important consequences for the transmission of fiscal policy. In our 
view, the increase in asset market participation that speaks from our exercise can be 
related to important institutional changes occurring at the beginning o f the 1980s. 1
1 JGaIi and Gertler (1999) consider the samples 1900:1-1979:1 and 1980:1-1997:1.
1,1 Indeed, our theoretical model can exhibit equilibrium indeterminacy coming from a variety of 
interacting sources: monetary policy, debt dynamics, the presence o f  non-asset holders and non- 
separabilitv o f utility.
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Some of the suggestive evidence regarding these changes was already mentioned in 
the introduction; for further details see Mishkin (1991) and Bilbiie (2004). Overall, 
the micro evidence on financial market participation seems neatly in line with our 
estimation results.
With respect to monetary policy, we detect a considerable change in the way the 
nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to expected inflation, the parameter
being estimated at 1.01 for Si and 1.57 for S2. Note again in this context 
that our estimate o f 0V has not been restricted to be greater than one and that 
parameter configurations implying equilibrium indeterminacy have been admitted 
throughout. Still, our procedure turns out to deliver an estimate that actually 
implies a determinate and unique equilibrium. Interestingly, the estimates are even 
fairly close to those reported by Clarida, Galt and Gertler (2000). Using single 
equation techniques, these authors report an implied long-run response coefficient of 
1.58 for a post-82 sample, while their corresponding estimate for data up to 1979 is 
0.83. In line with the literature, our results thus suggest that the FED has adopted 
a stronger anti-inflationary stand under Chairmen Volcker and Greenspan compared 
to their predecessors in the 1960s and 1970s.
Turning to the parameters characterizing fiscal policy, note first that the esti­
mate for (f>b of —0.09 in both samples implies a tendency towards debt stabilization: 
in response to a higher level of debt, the structural deficit is reduced in both sam­
ples. The order of magnitude of these estimates is in line with results obtained by 
Bohn (1998) using single equation techniques. The second important fiscal-policy 
parameter, <j>q, governs the degree of deficit finance associated with a government 
spending shock. Here, we observe a substantial change across samples, the esti­
mate rising from from 0.17 to 0.58, suggesting an increase in the reliance on deficits 
to  finance a spending unit. This result clearly reflects the strong increase in debt 
which, according to the empirical impulse responses, follows a sudden increase in 
government spending in S2 but not in SI. Next, the autoregressive parameter rj is 
estimated to increase from 0.46 to 0.75 from SI to S2, implying greater persistence 
o f  deficits in the second sample. These values are higher than the 0.25 reported in 
Gali and Perotti (2003), who use single-equation techniques and allow the deficit to 
respond to the output gap instead of government spending. Finally, /q is estimated 
to be 1.04 (SI) and 0.65 (S2), while p2 >s estimated to be —0.08 (SI) and 0.25 (S2). 
These coefficients sum up to 0.94 and 0.90, respectively, thus reflecting the higher 
persistence of the spending response in Si.
Taken together, our estimation exercise provides a set of parameter values that 
strike us as plausible and insightful. The estimates indicate that the principal 
changes from Si to S2 consist of widened private access to asset markets, more 
hawkish monetary policy, and a greater degree of deficit finance. The goal o f the 
next section will be to relate these changes in institutions and policies to the dif­
ferences in fiscal transmission that are visible from the empirical impulse responses 
in figure 1. Specifically, in a model-based counterfactual analysis we will attempt 
to evaluate which of the three factors - asset markets, monetary policy, or fiscal 
policy itself - have been pivotal for the observed decline in the effects o f government
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spending on the US economy. For this exercise to be meaningful, we would like our 
mode] to give a reasonably good account of the dynamic responses in the data. The 
low criterion function minima reported in table 2 already suggest that the theoret­
ical impulse responses do not differ too much from the empirical ones in terms of 
point-wise standard deviations. Graphically the good fit can be seen from figure 
1, where we reproduce the impulse responses implied by the parameter estimates of 
table 2 (solid starred line). The figure clearly shows that the model accounts quite 
well for the VAR-based evidence on fiscal policy transmission. Both the magnitude 
and the persistence of the impulse responses are replicated, and the model-based 
responses remain consistently within the empirical confidence intervals. While in SI 
fiscal policy has a strong and persistent effect on output, wages and consumption, 
these effects are less significant and considerably less persistent in S2. The behavior 
of debt in the data is also matched by the model.
3.6 Model-based counterfactual analysis
One neat implication of working with a structural model o f the macroeconomy is that 
well-defined "policy experiments" can be considered in a way that is less prone to the 
Lucas critique than counterfactual simulations of reduced-form models. Specifically, 
keeping constant the model structure and deep parameters across samples, we are 
in a position to explore various possible causes for the apparent changes in the 
transmission o f fiscal shocks. To do so, we rely on counterfactual experiments similar 
in spirit to the exercise provided by Boivin and Giannoni (2003) and Stock and 
Watson (2003) in the context of monetary policy.
Basically, we seek to assess three hypotheses for why fiscal policy may have 
weaker effects in S2: i) changes in the conduct of fiscal policy as reflected in the 
estimated parameters |/q, p2’ ; ii) changes in the monetary regime as reflected
in the parameter iii) an increase in asset market participation, i.e. the estimated 
fall in A. While these policy or institutional parameters are subject to change over 
time, we posit that everything else has remained stable between SI and S2, so 
differences in transmission are necessarily caused by some combination of changes 
in the above-mentioned parameters.
The goal o f this section is to evaluate which parameter changes, in particular, 
may be critical for obtaining the reduced effects o f government expenditure. Need­
less to say, the full extent o f variation between SI and S2 can only be accounted for 
by simultaneous variation of all estimated parameters. Put differently, there are pos­
sibly important interactions between different parameters, so the observed changes 
between Si and S2 are not simply the sum of the effects o f univariate parameter 
changes. Although we cannot investigate all of the possible cross effects, we still 
deem it worthwhile to investigate which individual parameter change alone would 
seem most powerful in driving our results.
In our subsequent analysis, we therefore vary one parameter at a time from its 
estimated SI value and evaluate the impact on the model's dynamic implications
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relative to the fitted Si impulse responses. Figure 2 contains all the results. To 
illustrate what is to be accounted for, i.e. the change in transmission according 
to our estimates, the first column displays the theoretical impulse responses of all 
five variables based on the respective parameter estimates for Si and S2. As stated 
before, all variables display a much less persistent response in S2, while the response 
o f the debt ratio even changes sign.
The panels in column b) display the responses corresponding to the Si parameter 
estimates along with the first set of counterfactual responses. The latter result from 
an evaluation of the model based on all parameters taking their Si values except 
A, which is reduced from 0.52 to its S2 value of 0.32. This experiment is meant to 
gauge the effect of a counterfactual increase in asset market participation from 48 
to G8 percent in the early sample. As a result, the responses can be seen to exhibit 
less persistence, because greater asset market participation allows more households 
to internalize the government budget constraint, so private consumption is reduced 
relative to the Si baseline case. Note that the quantitative magnitude of this may 
be understated due to our use of the point estimate of A for S2 in the counterfactual 
exercise. Indeed, taking into account that this estimate is in fact insignificant would 
reinforce this effect and lead to yet weaker responses of output, consumption and 
real wages. To the extent that the consumption and output responses are muted, the 
increase in asset market participation works towards explaining the smaller effect of 
government spending.
However, this effect has to be put into perspective by considering our next ex­
periment. The panels in column c) display the consequences of varying the degree of 
monetary policy activism, i.e. the effect o f increasing <f>n from 1.01 to 1.57. Indeed, 
the observed change in responses is more dramatic in this case, notably for con­
sumption. We interpret this piece of evidence as follows: Had monetary policy been 
more anti-inflationary in SI, a typical increase in government spending, by inducing 
inflation, would have triggered higher nominal interest rates and caused households 
to postpone consumption. This would have dampened consumption, output and the 
real wage enough to drive their responses close to or even below the levels observed 
for S2. It is in this sense that the estimated change in monetary policy turns out 
to be a quantitatively powerful factor pushing results in the right direction, i.e. a 
smaller expansionary impact of government spending shocks on the economy after 
1980. As can be seen from the second last row of column c), consumption would 
have actually fallen on impact, if only monetary policy had changed from its Si to 
its S2 stance. Moreover, a more active montetary policy would have induced a mild 
increase in the debt to GDP ratio as the tax revenues would have been lower rela­
tive to the Si baseline case. However, note that this experiment leaves the shape of 
the impulse responses largely unaffected. Therefore, while the change in monetary 
policy plays a large role in explaining the change in the magnit ude of the responses 
at a given point in time, it cannot, by itself, account for the change in the dynamic 
pattern (and notably persistence) of the responses to a government spending shock.
The last two columns consider changes in the conduct of fiscal policy itself. First, 
in column d) we compare the fitted Si responses with what would have happened
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if the process of gove mine lit expenditure had been less persistent. Specifically, we 
change both /q and p2 to their respective S2 values, while all other parameters stay at 
their Si levels. Lower persistence in government spending implies a weaker negative 
wealth effect and therefore might, on the one hand, reduce the negative effect of a 
spending shock on private consumption. On the other hand, lower persistence also 
induces a smaller increase in labor demand and hence the real wage, which, in turn, 
strengthens the negative effect on private consumption. As our results show, the 
second effect appears to dominate in this case. Output increases less than under the 
SI baseline scenario if the lower persistence of the S2 spending process is assumed. 
As a result, the consumption response turns out weaker, as well. Although these 
effects do go in the right direction, they seem relatively limited, especially compared 
to the contribution of monetary policy examined before.
Finally we evaluate the consequences of altering the degree of deficit finance. 
For this purpose, we set the relevant parameter 0g from its SI value o f 0.17 to the 
higher S2 value of 0.58. The panels in column e) show that such a change would 
induce much stronger positive responses of all variables and prevent a fall in debt. 
While the more pronounced increase in consumption, output and the real wage 
runs counter to the observed differences between Si and S2, the stabilization o f 
debt actually works towards accounting for the rise in debt observed in the second 
sample. Apparently the rise in <pq is crucial for the change of sign in the debt 
response, while its counter factual implications for the remaining series are offset by 
other simultaneous parameter changes.
Overall, our exercises suggest the following tentative conclusion. The change in 
the effects o f government spending identified in the empirical exercise regards both 
the magnitude and the dynamic pattern of the impulse responses. Among the indi­
vidual parameter changes that we consider, a more active monetary policy appears 
to be the most powerful factor driving down the magnitude of the effects of govern­
ment spending on consumption and output in the second sample. The dampening 
effect of a tougher anti-inflationary stance is complemented by greater asset market 
participation and less persistent spending shocks, although the latter two changes 
affect the magnitude in a quantitatively less important way. However, in order to 
account for the change in the shape and persistence of the responses, the increase in 
asset market participation in particular and changes in parameters governing fiscal 
policy arc necessary. Hence, while none of the candidate explanations can by itself 
provide a satisfactory account of the change in the effects o f government spending, 
our coimterfactual experiments identify the specific role played by each of these 
explanations.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we make essentially two contributions. First, we add to the emerging 
evidence that the transmission of government spending shocks in the l TS economy 
lias changed substantially in the post-1980s. Second, we try to account for these
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changes by considering a DSGE model whose implications for fiscal transmission are 
driven by a set of structural and institutional parameters.
To establish the stylized facts of fiscal transmission, we consider a parsimonious 
VAR that is specified in accordance with our theoretical model. The main finding 
is that an exogenous increase in government spending leads to a sustained rise in 
output, consumption and the real wage in the period 1957-1979 but has less signif­
icant and much less persistent effects on these variables after 1982. Moreover, the 
financing of government spending shocks appears to have changed, as indicated by 
the distinct responses of government debt across the two samples. Together, these 
results confirm earlier studies by Perotti (2005) and Mihov (2003).
Why does US fiscal policy have less expansionary effects in the second sample? 
Starting from our VAR-based evidence, we try to relate the differences in fiscal trans­
mission to important institutional and policy changes in the US economy. Clearly, 
our analysis must confront the Lucas critique, so we resort to a structural model. 
Specifically, we propose a New Keynesian DSGE model that features limited asset 
market participation as a potential institutional explanation for different degrees of 
fiscal policy effectiveness. In addition, the model encompasses simple specifications 
of both fiscal and monetary policies, so several competing hypotheses can be taken 
into account as to the reasons for the observed change in fiscal transmission.
We take our structural model to the data by matching its implied impulse re­
sponses with those obtained from the VAR. In contrast to many other applications of 
minimum distance estimation, we ensure that the model’s dynamics are fully nested 
in the VAR, thus addressing a recent critique of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005). 
Our approach provides us with estimates of the key policy and institutional parar 
meters for the early and the late sample, respectively, while all deep parameters 
are held constant. The results suggest that asset market participation increased 
noticeably in the post 1980s, in line with earlier informal evidence. We also find 
that government spending has become less persistent but more deficit-financed in 
the second sample and that monetary policy has become more active.
Given these estimates, we carry out counterfactual experiments within the frame­
work of our structural model. Specifically, we consider the quantitative impact of 
single policy or institutional reforms in order to evaluate which of the candidate 
changes in the ITS economic environment is most powerful in accounting for the 
differences in fiscal transmission before and after 1980. A ceteris paribus increase 
in asset market participation to the level estimated for the second sample leads 
to somewhat weaker output, consumption and real wage effects of a government 
spending shock, thus explaining part o f the difference in the fiscal multiplier across 
samples. Importantly, and unlike changes in any other parameters, it also leads to 
a change in the shape of the impulse responses consistent with that observed in the 
data. The most important single determinant of the change in the magnitude of 
the effects, however, turns out to be the observed change in monetary policy as a 
tougher anti-inflationary stance after 1980 has acted to reduce the expansionary ef­
fects of a surprise increase in government spending. Finally, changes in fiscal policy 
parameters (persistence of shocks and, more importantly degree of deficit financing)
i
84 Chapter 3 -  Declining Fiscal Mill it plier
play a somewhat more limited role in accounting for the difference in the responses 
o f output, consumption and wages, but the latter is crucial in explaining the dynam­
ics of debt. In our view, these results highlight the importance of considering the 
interaction o f monetary and fiscal policy on the one hand, and macro policies and 
the development of financial markets on the other, to gain a better understanding 
o f  how important shocks are transmitted in the macroeconomy.
3.8 Appendix
A . Steady state
Here we calculate the coefficients used in the log-linearized equilibrium. For any 
variable X t, X  denotes its steady-state value and X y  its steady-state share in output, 
X/Y. The Euler equation (3.3) implies l +  r =  R  =  \f¡3. From the firm’s problem 
(3.12), we have for the real wage
W e - l
P  ~  5
(3.19)
while production (3.11) in steady state implies Y  =  N  — F. Defining p  =  —j  — 1, 
we rewrite (3.19) as
W  Y  +  F  Y  \ + F y  
P  ~  N { l + p ) ~  N  1 +  ft ‘
Profits in steady state imply O — Y  — \W/P] N , so that profits over output are 
given by
O y P — F y1 +  p
We assume that hours are the same for the two groups in steady state only, =  
Na — IV. Because of preference homogeneity (see section 2), we need to ensure that 
steady-state consumption shares are also equal across groups. This can be seen by 
comparing (3.5) with (3.8) evaluated at the steady state:
CA _  1 -  t  IF C N 
L ”  p P  ~  L
implying C a — Cn =  C. The steady-state coefficients needed for our log-linear 
approximation below are fully determined as:
( !  r ) p  y
Ç a
Y
y
Ty
(1 -  r ) 1 +  Fy
l +  p '
(‘ - ' i r h i ’ - ' T TÏr)-Tr-
/i   ^ 1 +  F y  
( !  - r ) n 7 - ~ TYi1 -f p
G y  — r.
(3.20)
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We achieve equalization of steady-state consumption shares (as required by prefer­
ence homogeneity coupled with equalization of hours) by making assumptions on 
technology. Specifically, we ensure that asset income in steady state is zero. This 
is achieved by assuming that the fixed cost of production is given by: Fy  =  f t } 7 
Substituting into (3.20) gives:
C  4 Cw
~ Y  =  -jT  =  Cy =  1 -  r - T y  =  1 - G y .
Next, we want to find hours in steady state. Solving the intratemporal condition 
after imposing equalization of hours and consumption we have (normalize P  =  1):
l | _  =  i z l . r  _  a  _  T) , r  *  _  t  =  i ^ i r  ( i  -  n ) .
Dividing by Y  and using (3.20) and the expression for the fixed cost we obtain 
constant steady-state hours given by:
N _  1 1 - T
1 — N ip 1 — G y ( 3 . 2 1 )
Given r  and Gy, we choose steady-state N  to match average hours worked, which 
implies from (3.21) an unique value for y?.
B. Log-linearized equilibrium
A local approximation of the model outlined in section 2 around its non-stochastic 
steady state delivers a dynamic system of linear difference equations that can be 
solved numerically. We outline the log-linear equations in this appendix. Small 
letters denote the log-deviation of a variable from its steady-state value while b( =  
D tf (P f-iY i-i), 7Tf =  logfP i/P f-i) and wt — log^ tD /P # )/ (H fP ))-  The sequences 
for the set o f variables we consider satisfy the following 13 conditions/definitions. 
Linearizing the Euler equation (3.3) and substituting steady-state hours from (3.21) 
gives
cA.t =  EfCAj+l------- ( f f  —  EtKt+l)o
+ (*+r=W) _ •
Note that when <t >  1, the elasticity o f consumption growth (E(Ca ^^i — c.A.t) to 
hours growth (Et7iAj+\ — n„4.*) becomes positive. In addition, the elasticity of con­
sumption to real interest rates is given by 1/(7. The labor choice of asset holders 
(3 .5 ), in log-deviations from steady state, is given by
N t x=  wt ~  (CAi -  7Ct-1). 17
17Note that this assumption implies that the share of profits in steady state, D y, is zero, in line 
with the evidence and arguments in e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1995),
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The linearized first-order condition and budget constraint, (3.8) and (3.7), for non­
asset holders read as follows:
N  t \------ - n ^ f  =  wt ~  (CN,t -  7Q_ i ) ,
I — 1V
(1 -  G y) c N t =  (1 -  r) (wt +  nN, t ) - T y tt.
Labour market clearing, using N a =  Nn — AT, implies
nt ~  An^ t +  (1 — A) ,
Aggregate consumption is given by
ct =  Ac^y +  (1 -  A) CA,t:
Up to a first-order approximation, the aggregate production function (3.11) is given
t>y
Vt =  (1 +  F y)n t}
A log-1 in (’a r approximation of the price setting problem (3.12), together with the 
definition of the price level, implies
TCf — dEfftt + l
, (1 -at)  {I - a f i )
+ ----------------------- wta
Next, consider the government sector. An approximation to the government budget 
constraint (3.14) divided by output reads as:
P h t+ i  =  bt +  G y g t -  T y t t -  r y t .
In turn, an approximation to the definition of structural primary deficit divided by 
output dsj  is given by:
{h,t = Gygt -  Tytt*
Our specification of the deficit rule (3.16) reads as
ds,t — y d s .t -  i +  & qG y9t +  *
Next, the monetary policy rule (3.13), in log deviations, is given by
7't =  <j>xEtTTt+\.
Finally, good market clearing implies
Vt — G yg t +  (1 — G y)ct.
lsFroin these two equations, one obtains a reduced-form labor supply for non-asset holders. We
have
n.v.e -T y —  («-’t -  ft) •1 +  (fT 1 — O y  +  7 y
Since —Ty >  0. hours of non-asset holders respond positively to increases in the real wage ict and 
taxes relative to their steady-state value T y tt.
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C. A model with money
The purpose of this appendix is to show that the principal implications of our model 
remain unaffected if we allow for money holdings by both agents and adopt a par­
ticular scheme for rebating seigniorage revenues. This setup gives non-asset holders 
some room for smoothing consumption by holding money. Suppose that utility is 
separable in money balances, such that period utility is, for an agent j  G {.4, iY} .
U ( C j" Iji"  i f  ) ti  >  0, h" <  0
while the budget constraints become, respectively:
E f + Pt^A,t + PtTt + M a ,i
=  Eaa +  +  (1 —  T){^tXA.t +  PiDaj) +  Pt$A,ti
PiC nj +  PtTt +  M nj
=  1 + (1 — r) li (JVjv,# + PtStf't
where Mjj are encl-of-period money holdings and PtSjj are nominal transfers re­
ceived from the government due to seigniorage revenues. Because of utility being 
separable in money, the first-order introduced outlined in the main body of the paper 
do not change. However, there are two additional first-order conditions governing 
the choice of money holdings Mj,t. For each agent, hl ( “7 ^ )  — Uc{Cj,u Ej,t.) +
ftE fp ^ U c  (Cj,t+i, — 0, which after some manipulation leads to a money
demand equation:
h' ( i f )  = ['“ U c (C j j , L m ) .
Since Rt 1 =  ¡5 Et [A^f+1] , we obtain a standard money demand schedule for as­
set holders: h* — [l — iijT1] Uc (Cvt.f? Laj)- Note that this money demand
depends negatively on interest rates.
Importantly, non-asset holders’ money demand does not depend directly on in­
terest rates. Although A $ +1 is defined similarly to A ¿ +j, in contrast to the latter it 
does not constitute a pricing kernel. The money demand of non-asset holders merely 
specifies the path of money holdings as a function of the entire path of consumption 
and inflation (and leisure in the non-separable case):
h' ( ^ w )  =  VC (CV'' ’ ~  3E> l f l V c {Ck> H • t 'v ' +1 > • (3--’ 2)
Note that money holdings will increase if present consumption increases and will fall 
if either future expected consumption or expected inflation increase. This introduces 
a channel for non-asset holders to smooth consumption that is absent in the cashless 
model.
88 Chapter 3 - Declining Fiscal Multiplier
In order to complete our description of the equilibrium we need to specify four 
more conditions (we have introduced six extra variables: AIa ,t, Mt- $N,t,
St and two extra equations governing money demand for each agent). The first two 
are straightforward. Money market clearing requires: M t =  AM^ t +  (1 — A) M ax - 
while the definition of total transfers reads as St =  AS^tt +  (1 — A) Sa x , which will 
enter the government budget constraint in a straightforward way.
The last two conditions are slightly more complicated and are related to the 
government's policy in redistributing seigniorage revenues to each group in the form 
of transfers. We choose to specify this policy in a way that implies the smallest 
deviation o f this model from both (i) a model without money and with non-asset 
holders as presented in section 2; and (ii) a model with money in which all agents 
have access to complete asset markets. Specifically, we assume that each agent j  
receives back in transfers precisely the amount that has been obtained from him as 
seigniorage:
A'fj,t. — Afjj—i
Sjj = (3.23)
Note that this is effectively the same assumption as is made in standard monetary 
models, where everybody holds assets and agents are identical so that the same 
equality also holds at an aggregate level. In our framework under this assumption, 
however, money holdings are different across agents, wliich implies that transfers 
across agents will also be different. The redistribution scheme in (3.23) implies 
that the budget constraint of the non-asset holders is identical to the one before: 
PfCNyt +  PtTt =  (1 — t ) H f whereby consumption tracks disposable income. 
In fact, all equilibrium conditions of the cashless model are unaffected. The money 
holdings of asset holders are determined by their money demand equation for a given 
a path of consumption, leisure and nominal interest rates, while the money holdings 
o f non-asset holders are determined endogenously by their money demand equation 
for a given path of consumption, leisure and expected inflation.19
19The same would hold if the government followed a money supply rule instead of a Taylor rule. 
For a given growth rate of total money Mt chosen by the government, the interest rate would be 
pinned down by the money demand equat ion of asset holders.
Table 1: Cumulative Impulse Responses to Spending Shock“
Variable Horizon SI S2 S2-S1
spending 4 3.82 2.G7 -1.14
(0.45) (0.32) (0.56)
12 10.99 6.40 -4.58
(2.57) (1.37) (2.92)
20 14.32 7.47 -6.84
(4.62) (2.58) (5.26)
output 4 1.71 0.94 -0.77
(0.56) (0.43) (0.70)
12 4.50 2.38 -2.12
(1.48) (1.39) (2.00)
20 5.99 2.62 -3.37
(2.19) (1.91) (2.90)
real wage 4 0.4G 0.50 0.05
(0.25) (0.62) (0.66)
12 2.16 0.34 -1.82
(0.81) (1.60) (1.78)
20 4.06 -0.89 -4.95
(1.39) (2.49) (2.85)
consumption 4 0.78 0.70 -0.08
(0.41) (0.37) (0.54)
12 2.74 1.64 -1.10(l.ii) (1.39) (1-74)
20 4.32 1,23 -3.09
(1.65) (2.22) (2.74)
debt, 4 -0.26 0.94 1.20
(0.28) (0.53) (0.60)
12 -1.64 4.92 6.56
(1.12) (2.96) (3.13)
20 -3.55 8.86 12.41
(2.13) (5.82) (6.13)
"Responses are percent deviations from unshocked path, except for debt,
which is percentage points of output. Standard errors obtained by boot­
strap are reported in parentheses.
Table 2: Estimated M odel Parameters6
Parameter SI S2
A 0.523 0.328
(0.065) (0.250)
<Pir 1.006 1.573
(0.009) (0.600)
<f>b -0.092 -0.096(0.211) (0.031)
0.168 0.580
(0.107) (0.199)
V 0.457 0.751(0.631) (0.245)
Pi 1.036 0.649(0.158) (0.143)
P2 -0.083 0.251
(0.155) (0.144)
Loss : 23.628 26.04Ó
^Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Transmission in estimated VAR and DSGE model
S1:1957-1979 S2:1983-2004
Legend: impulse responses to one percent increase in real government spending. Shaded areas indicate bootstrapped 90 percent 
confidence intervals. VAR model: dots. DSGE model: stars. Vertical axes indicate deviations from unshocked path.
Horizontal axes indicate quarters. DSGE model simulation based on parameter estimates obtained by matching VAR-responses.
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Figure 2: What accounts for the change in transmission?
a) baseline b) varying X c) varying 4» d) varying p e )  v a r y i n g  <j>
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Legend: model impulse responses for S1 and S2 parameter estimates (column a)). Columns b) to e) contrast responses resulting 
from S1 baseline estimate with counterfactual responses resulting from varying each parameter of interest from S1 to S2 estimate.
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